

# UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD514794	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	unclassified
FROM:	confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO:	Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM:	Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 13 MAR 1971. Other requests shall be referred to Defense Military Assistance Command Vietnam, APO San Francisco, CA 96222. NOFORN.
AUTHORITY	
agc, d/a ltr 12 apr 1976; agc, d/a ltr 12 apr 1976	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

# **SECURITY**

---

# **MARKING**

**The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.**

**Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.**

---


THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

AD 514 794

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(4)



11-1-71  
12-1-71

FILE COPY

# MACV SEER REPORT.

A SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF.

## PART I.

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN),  
VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMAR),  
VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN).

4TH QTR CY 70

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT  
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
BY AUTHORITY OF COMUSMACV

GROUP 4


Downgraded at 3 year  
intervals; declassified  
after 12 years

**CONFIDENTIAL**

22/4/71 (13)

SESSION for		
TESTI	WIDE COVER <input type="checkbox"/>	
DOC	BWP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
UNANNOUNCED	<input type="checkbox"/>	
JUSTIFICATION.....		
BY .....		
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATE		
NO.	AVAIL.	NO./Y
2		

CONFIDENTIAL



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

MACJ3-051

13 March 1970

SUBJECT: USMACV SEER Report, Part I, 4th Qtr CY 70

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. This report is prepared quarterly to provide COMUSMACV, MACV staff agencies and advisors with an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).
2. The content of the USMACV SEER Report is derived from operational statistics and responses to quarterly questionnaires submitted by senior advisors as a part of the MACV System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER). This part of the report contains ARVN/VNMC and VNN evaluations. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) portion of this report is published under separate cover as Part II.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN P. GAGNE  
CPT, USA  
Asst AG

1 Incl  
USMACV SEER Report, Part I  
4th Qtr CY 70

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL  
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE  
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S. C., SECTION 793 AND 794.  
ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN  
ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN  
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED  
INCLOSURE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS BY AUTHORITY OF  
COMUSMACV, \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT #2 CLASSIFIED

In addition to security requirements which must be met, this document is subject to special controls and each transmittal to foreign nationals may be made only with prior approval of \_\_\_\_\_

MACJ3-051

SUBJECT: USMACV SEER Report, Part I, 4th Qtr CY 70

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - OSD	2 - DSA, MR 3
5 - JCS	5 - SA, MR 4/CG, DMAC
1 - CofS, US Army	2 - SA, Arty Adv Gp
1 - HQ DA, DCSOPS	9 - SA, 1st Div
1 - HQ DA, OCMH	6 - SA, 2d Div
1 - CNO	7 - SA, 22d Div
1 - CofS, USAF	6 - SA, 23d Div
1 - Comdt, USMC	6 - SA, 5th Div
6 - CINCPAC	6 - SA, 18th Div
1 - CINCPACAF	6 - SA, 25th Div
1 - CINCUSARPAC	6 - SA, 7th Div
1 - DDC	6 - SA, 9th Div
1 - Air University Library	6 - SA, 21st Div
2 - US Embassy	7 - SA, Abn Div Adv Det
1 - COMNAVFORV	2 - SA, Marine Adv Gp
1 - CG, 7th AF	1 - SA, CMD
1 - OSD/ARPA-REDFU-V	1 - SA, 51st Regt
4 - CG, USARV	
2 - Chief, USAF Adv Gp	1 - SA, Ranger Command Adv Det
2 - Chief, NAG	1 - SA, 1st Ranger Gp HQ
1 - MACJ01	1 - SA, 2d Ranger Gp
2 - MACJ03	1 - SA, 3d Ranger Gp
1 - MACJ1	1 - SA, 4th Ranger Gp
7 - MACJ2	1 - SA, 5th Ranger Gp
30 - MACJ3	1 - SA, 6th Ranger Gp
2 - MACJ4	1 - SA, Armor Command Adv Gp
2 - MACJ5	1 - SA, 44th STZ
1 - MACJ6	1 - SA, 1st TF Bde MR 1
10 - MACCORDS	1 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
3 - MACMA	2 - CG, 23d Inf Div
1 - MACAG	2 - CG, 101st Abn Div (Air Mobile)
2 - MACIG	2 - CG, 1st Mar Div
1 - MACOI	1 - CG, 173d Abn Bde
1 - MACSA	1 - CO, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)
7 - MACT (includes NTCs)	1 - 509th RR GP (Adv Div)
1 - MACSOG	2 - CG, Military Assistance Institute
1 - MACMD	Ft, Bragg, N.C.
1 - MACCSD	1 - Army War College
3 - SA, MR 1/CG, XXIV Corps	
2 - DSA, MR 1	
3 - SA, MR 2/CG, IFFV	
2 - DSA, MR 2	
5 - SA, MR 3/CG, IIEFV	

PART I: ARVN/VNMC AND VNN FORCES

C O N T E N T S

<u>PARA</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
1.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
a.	Coverage.....	1
b.	Data and Information Sources.....	1
c.	Factors Influencing Performance.....	1
2.	SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE.....	2
a.	Effectiveness.....	2
b.	Problem Areas.....	3
3.	ARMY AND MARINE FORCES EVALUATION.....	5
a.	Environmental Aspects.....	5
	Charts: 1 - Military Region 1.....	6
	2 - Military Region 2.....	8
	3 - Military Region 3.....	10
	4 - Military Region 4.....	12
b.	Enemy-Initiated Incidents.....	14
	Charts: 5 - Enemy Initiated Incidents Against ARVN/ VNMC.....	15
	6 - Enemy Initiated Incidents MR 1, MR 2, MR 3, and MR 4.....	16
c.	Contacts.....	17
	Chart: 7 - Enemy Contacts by ARVN Infantry Battalions...	17
d.	Effort.....	18
	(1) Percent Time on Missions Country-wide.....	18
	(2) Percent Time Spent on Missions Within Each Military Region.....	18
	(3) Comparison of Time Spent on Missions by ARVN Infantry Battalions.....	18
	Charts: 8 - ARVN/VNMC Percent Time Spent on Missions.....	19
	9 - Distribution of Effort.....	19

Table: 1 - Comparison of Time Spent on Missions by ARVN Infantry Battalions .....	20
e. Combined and Unilateral Combat Operations.....	21
Charts: 10 - Combined and Unilateral Operations .....	21
11 - Casualty Ratios US & GVN Regular Forces .....	22
f. Results .....	22
(1) US & GVN Regular Forces Casualty Ratios .....	22
(2) Enemy Eliminated .....	22
(3) Weapons Captured .....	22
Charts: 12 - ARVN/VNMC Average Bn Results Country- wide .....	23
13 - ARVN/VNMC Enemy Elim Per Battalion .....	24
(4) Caches .....	25
Chart: 14 - Caches .....	25
(5) Ambushes .....	26
Chart: 15 - Ambushes .....	26
g. Combat Support .....	27
Charts: 16 - Combat Support Provided ARVN/VNMC (Per Bn) .....	27
17 - Combat Support Provided ARVN Infantry (Per Bn) MR 1, MR 2, MR 3, MR 4 .....	29
h. Operational Effectiveness Assessments .....	30
Charts: 18 - Average Operational Effectiveness of ARVN/VNMC .....	30
19 - ARVN/VNMC Operational Effectiveness Assessments .....	31
i. Division, Regiment and Battalion Staff Element Evaluations .....	32
Charts: 20 - Evaluation of Command and Staff Functions Regiment/Division .....	33



CONFIDENTIAL

21 - Evaluation of Command and Staff Functions	
Inf Bns.....	33
j. Summary of ARVN/VNMC Performance Indicators.....	34
Charts: 22 - ARVN/VNMC Performance Indicators.....	35
k. Evaluation of Infantry Divisions/Separate Regiments.....	37
Charts: 23 - 1st Division.....	38
24 - 2d Division.....	40
25 - 51st Regiment.....	42
26 - 22d Division.....	44
27 - 23d Division.....	46
28 - 5th Division.....	48
29 - 18th Division.....	50
30 - 25th Division.....	52
31 - 7th Division.....	54
32 - 9th Division.....	56
33 - 21st Division.....	58
34 - Airborne Division.....	60
35 - Enemy Elim by Airborne Battalions.....	62
36 - Enemy Elim by Armored Cavalry Squadrons.....	63
37 - Armored Cavalry Squadrons.....	64
38 - Marine Division.....	66
39 - Enemy Elim by Marine Battalions.....	68
40 - Enemy Elim by Ranger Battalions.....	69
41 - Ranger Battalions.....	70
4. ARVN/VNMC PROBLEM AREAS.....	72
a. General.....	72
b. Infantry Battalion Strength.....	72
Charts: 42 - ARVN/VNMC Personnel Assigned.....	72
43 - Assigned Strength ARVN Infantry Bns.....	73
c. Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps.....	73
Charts: 44 - Number of ARVN/VNMC Deaths Caused by	
Mines and Booby Traps.....	73
45 - Percent Friendly KIA from Mines and	
Booby Traps.....	74
d. Battalion Problem Areas.....	75
Charts: 46 - Battalion Problem Areas, Part I.....	76
Battalion Problem Areas, Part II.....	77

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Staff Problem Areas.....	79
Chart: 47 - Staff Problem Areas, Part I.....	80
Staff Problem Areas, Part II.....	81
f. Training Assessment.....	82
Charts: 48 - ARVN/VNMC Training Effectiveness	
Assessments.....	83
49 - Advisors' Assessment of Training.....	85
50 - Time Spent on Training by Infantry Bns.....	86
51 - Refresher Training.....	87
5. VIETNAMESE NAVAL FORCES EVALUATION.....	88
a. Introduction.....	88
b. Summary of Performance.....	88
c. Improvement and Modernization.....	89
Charts: 52 - USN Craft Turned over to VNN.....	91
53 - VNN Personnel Assigned .....	91
54 - VNN Training.....	94
55 - Logistics Lift Craft Results.....	95
56 - Craft Availability.....	97
Tables: 2 - Actual and Planned VNN Craft Inventories.....	90
3 - Personnel Manning Levels.....	92
4 - Training.....	93
5 - Supply Effectiveness.....	95
d. Operational Performance.....	98
Charts: 57 - Vietnamese Naval Craft Employment.....	99
58 - Vietnamese Naval Craft Employment.....	100
Tables: 6 - Performance Indicators.....	101
e. Areas of Operational Responsibility.....	102
Chart: 59 Riverine Operations.....	103
f. Operational Results.....	104
Chart: 60 Vietnamese Navy Results.....	105
Glossary of Acronyms.....	106

ANNEXES:

- A. Enemy Contacts
- B. Enemy Initiated Incidents and Results
- C. Effort, Results and Caches Discovered
- D. Advisors' Assessment Tables
- E. Combat Support Received

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 1. (U-FOUO) INTRODUCTION.

(several components of the Armed Forces)

a. Coverage. This report addresses the operational effectiveness of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VMMC), the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) during 4th Qtr CY 70. The Vietnamese Air Force portion of the report is published as Part II. The status and performance of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) are covered in separate reports, the most comprehensive of which is the MACCORDS Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES).

### b. Data and Information Sources.

(1) General. Operational statistics are derived from the SEER Monthly Operational Statistics Reports submitted to MACV by US advisors assigned to ARVN/VNMC units. Significant problem areas are reported quarterly by corps senior advisors. Assessments of operational effectiveness, leadership, training, staff functions and problem areas of ARVN and VNMC units are derived from advisors' responses to the SEER quarterly questionnaire. Enemy force strength data is obtained from MACJ2. Friendly force strength data is received from MACJ1 and the Territorial Forces Evaluation System. Input for the naval forces portion of this report is received from the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, and the Senior Naval Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, in the form of monthly and quarterly reports.

(2) Revised MACV SEER Questionnaire. This questionnaire was completely revised in late 1969 to provide a greater range of information for evaluating important areas of command interest in ARVN/VNMC effectiveness. The new questionnaire was implemented on a test basis during the fourth quarter 1969 reporting period, providing an overlap of old and new data bases, and allowing the old and new results to be directly compared. The new questionnaire provides a more precise measurement of many attributes of ARVN/VNMC units covered by the old questionnaire, as well as expanded coverage into areas previously not considered. Hence, the evaluations derived from the two questionnaires are not identical, and those trend lines displayed in this report which cover several quarters may have a discontinuity in the 4th Qtr CY 69.

c. Factors Influencing Performance. Many factors, such as differences in terrain, size of areas, enemy/friendly density, level of activity, weather, and tactics employed by opposing forces affect the results as shown in this report.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 2. (C-NOFORN) SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE.

### a. Effectiveness.

(1) Allocation of Effort. During the fourth quarter 1970, the level of effort devoted to combat operations increased slightly to 59 percent, and time spent on active pacification increased to approximately eight percent. Sixteen percent of the ARVN/VNMC effort was expended on security missions. Time devoted to training, reserve, and rehabilitation decreased slightly.

(2) Contacts and Enemy-Initiated Incidents. Country-wide enemy contacts by ARVN infantry battalions totaled 2,097 in the fourth quarter, rising above the third quarter figure of 1,771. Contacts with enemy units of platoon size or smaller increased this quarter to 88 percent of the total, while battalion size contacts decreased to four percent. There was a decrease in the number of enemy-initiated incidents against ARVN/VNMC units during the fourth quarter.

(3) Operational Results. Results during the fourth quarter remained near third quarter levels after the two year highs obtained in the 2d Qtr CY 70. Friendly losses decreased slightly while enemy eliminated increased, resulting in a casualty ratio of 9.3:1, the most favorable in the past two years. This ratio has been on an uptrend since the 2d Qtr CY 69. Weapons captured and lost were both slightly lower than last quarter, but the ratio of weapons captured to weapons lost reached a new high of 34.7:1. Total cache finds increased this quarter, due mainly to a large ammunition cache located by the 22d Division in Cambodia.

(4) Operational Effectiveness. The US advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness are subjective evaluations of how well their units perform the mechanics of warfare and are not necessarily indicative of the operational results achieved by those units; operational results are also influenced by the environment, enemy, combat support received, and mission assigned. The average operational effectiveness assessment for the fourth quarter reached an all time high.

(5) Cambodian Operations. During the fourth quarter, 14 percent of the ARVN/VNMC effort was spent in Cambodia. Most performance measures were better in Cambodia than in RVN, indicating the continued better return per unit of combat effort expended. For the 14 percent of effort, ARVN/VNMC obtained 24 percent of all enemy eliminated and 31 percent of all weapons captured. However, they suffered 20 percent of all friendly losses and 24 percent of all weapons lost. The ratios indicating relative efficiency were better in Cambodia than overall: the casualty ratio was 10.6:1 versus 9.3:1; enemy eliminated per hour of contact was 5.3:1 versus 3.4:1; weapons captured per enemy eliminated was 0.30:1 versus 0.23:1; and the weapons ratio was 44.3:1 versus 34.7:1.

(6) Unit Performance. Highlighted as the top performing units during the fourth quarter were the 2d, 7th, 18th and 23d Divisions and the 51st Regiment. Last quarter, the 23d Division and 51st Regiment were rated as substandard performers.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## b. Problem Areas.

(1) Leadership. The leadership evaluation of ARVN/VNMC is developed from the quarterly questionnaire submitted by advisors. The quality of leadership has generally improved during the quarter, but continues to be a problem among lower ranking officers and noncommissioned officers. Specialized leadership courses at division training centers, and increased numbers of small unit operations, are serving to correct this deficiency. This problem reveals itself in many ways, the most serious of which is the lack of aggressiveness demonstrated by many organizations. During the fourth quarter, seven percent of the battalion advisors reported that their units were not aggressive when in contact with the enemy. The overall ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalion leadership assessment has increased during the fourth quarter. The leadership problem continues to be reported as greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(2) Training. The total time spent in training by ARVN battalions decreased this quarter. The quality of training improved during the fourth quarter, however, with most categories receiving a smaller percentage of "poor" ratings from advisors than in the third quarter. An accelerated program to provide battalion refresher training was planned for 1970, but increased combat activity caused cancellation of approximately half of this training.

(3) Inadequacies within Division, Regiment, and Battalion Staffs. During the fourth quarter, substantial numbers of advisors still reported G2/S2, G3/S3, and G4/S4 functions to be inadequate. A greater percentage of advisors reported inadequacies within battalion staffs than in regimental and division staffs.

(4) Intelligence. The intelligence functions at all staff levels continued to be reported as a major staff problem. The intelligence collection effort of ARVN battalions was reported as slightly less effective this quarter than during the third quarter, and the intelligence received from higher headquarters was frequently untimely.

(5) Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps. In the fourth quarter, deaths from mines and booby traps increased, and since total friendly KIA decreased, the percent of total casualties due to mines and booby traps increased to 32 percent. MR 1 and MR 4 units still sustain a large number of casualties from these devices.

(6) Maneuver Battalion Strength. Strength in the major combat elements of ARVN/VNMC increased by approximately 1,500 men in the fourth quarter. The desertion rate in ARVN/VNMC major combat elements remained constant at about 34 per 1,000 assigned. Desertions in the major combat elements of ARVN/VNMC continued to be a major problem and constituted the greatest single manpower drain in RVNAF.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(7) Logistics. Failure to exercise properly the ARVN supply system continued to be a major problem area. This is especially noticeable in that portion of the system dealing with requisitioning and distributing major items of equipment and repair parts. The number of artillery units reporting a shortage of repair parts as a major problem rose from 43 percent during the third quarter to 65 percent during the fourth quarter. The number of maneuver battalions reporting the same problem dropped from 46 percent to 43 percent in the fourth quarter. Each MR reported at least one serious problem resulting from the unresponsiveness of the ARVN supply system. Many supply problems continued to be surfaced through advisor actions. The ARVN Supply System remained unresponsive and frequently unaware of the requirements of the units it supports.

(8) Unit Performance. The 5th Division, the armored cavalry, and the rangers displayed relatively low performance during the quarter. The cavalry devoted much of its time to security and did not achieve the outstanding results which characterized its second quarter performance.

# CONFIDENTIAL


## 3. (C-NOFORN) ARMY AND MARINE FORCES EVALUATION.

a. Environmental Aspects. On the following pages are environmental conditions and characteristics for each military region. These conditions are considered important in analyzing results and performance of ARVN/VNMC units. Charts 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the average numbers of enemy and friendly maneuver battalions present in each TAOR during the fourth quarter; relative strength of enemy and friendly maneuver elements, and enemy and friendly densities in each TAOR. Friendly strengths are subdivided to show FWMAF, ARVN, and RF/PF. Enemy strengths are subdivided to show NVA/VC infantry and guerrilla elements and are computed to include all enemy maneuver elements, less headquarters. Arrows indicate previous quarter strengths.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

6



# CONFIDENTIAL

## MILITARY REGION 1 ENVIRONMENT


### CONDITIONS

### CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain	The Chaine Annamitique Mountains dominate the area. Rain forests covering the mountains offer refuge to the enemy. In the west, the Chaine Annamitique grades into rolling upland plains, with altitudes between 1,500 and 3,000 feet above sea level. In the east the mountains drop off sharply to narrow coastal plains.
Weather	At the start of the 4th Qtr CY 70, the northeast monsoon was developing in strength. October had eight days of good flying weather; otherwise, the region was subjected to unusually heavy rains, due in part to tropical storms and typhoons. The weather continued to be typical of the monsoon, with only six days of good or marginal weather reported in November, and the same in December.
Population	The majority of the population of about three million (17 percent of the national total) is settled along the coast. Da Nang and Hue are the only major cities in the area.
GVN Control	Relatively secure (HES rating A, B, and C): hamlets 94.5 percent; population 96.9 percent.
Enemy Forces	The total enemy strength decreased slightly, and one less battalion was operating during 4th Qtr CY 70. The 1st Division's TAOR continues to have the highest enemy density in the Republic. The figure of 40,054 reflects only maneuver battalions. The total enemy strength reported is 75,216.
Friendly Forces	The total friendly strength also declined slightly. RF/PF strength includes the Border Ranger battalions, which were converted during CY 70 from the CIDG forces.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

8



# CONFIDENTIAL

## MILITARY REGION 2 ENVIRONMENT

### CONDITIONS

### CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain	The largest of the military regions, MR 2 is characterized by the diverse terrain features consisting of coastal plains, highland plateaus, mountains and dense jungles. The area is, for the most part, sparsely populated and underdeveloped.
Weather	The northeast monsoons adversely affected flying conditions in MR 2 less than in MR 1. The coastal plains and the mountains east of the Annam ridgeline had good or marginal weather during three-fourths of October, decreasing slightly to about two-thirds in November and December. West of the ridgeline, only two days of poor flying weather and 25 days of marginal weather were reported during the entire quarter. Marginal conditions were caused mainly by morning fog and stratus.
Population	The majority of the population of about 3.2 million (18 percent of the national total) is settled along the coast. Qui Nhon and Nha Trang are the major cities of the coast area. The population inland is largely Montagnard.
GVN Control	Relatively secure (HES rating A, B, and C): hamlets 85.3 percent; population 93.6 percent.
Enemy Forces	The number and distribution of enemy battalions remained the same as reported for the previous quarter. Total number of enemy in the region assigned to maneuver units remained about the same; the figure of 29,592 reflects only maneuver battalions. The total enemy strength reported is 43,854.
Friendly Forces	The TAORs of the 23d and 22d Divisions are lowest and second lowest in density of friendly troops; enemy density is lowest and third lowest in the same regions. The reduction of US combat forces contributed to the drop of about eight percent in strength during the 4th Qtr CY 70. CIDG personnel have been converted to Border Ranger battalions, but are still included in the RF/PF totals.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

10



# CONFIDENTIAL


## MILITARY REGION 3 ENVIRONMENT

### CONDITIONS

### CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain	The MR 3 area is one of transition. The southern portion consists of rich, flat lands which flood during the rainy season. In the eastern regions, there are mangrove swamps, dense forests, and rubber plantations. In the northwestern areas, the terrain becomes mountainous with elevations up to 1,500 feet.
Weather	October had several days of poor or marginal weather, due to fog and low stratus, and the passage of a tropical depression late in the month. November had four days of marginal weather, and December was reported as good for the entire month. The entire period was frequently marked with the early-morning fog and stratus, causing some flight restrictions for short periods of time.
Population	MR 3 has the second largest population, about 5.2 million (30 percent of the national total), and includes the national capital (Saigon) with a population of about 2.2 million.
GVN Control	Relatively secure (HES rating A, B, and C): hamlets 98.4 percent; population 99.1 percent.
Enemy Forces	Enemy maneuver battalion strength increased about three percent during 4th Qtr CY 70; one more VC Main Force battalion, and one less sapper battalion, were reported. Total enemy strength, including the maneuver battalion strength, is reported to be 71,597.
Friendly Forces	Total friendly strength dropped by 14 percent, due largely to the redeployment of US units. CIDG personnel have been converted to Border Ranger battalions, and are included in the RF/PF totals.

### Chart 4



**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

## MILITARY REGION 4 ENVIRONMENT

### CONDITIONS

### CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain	MR 4 includes the delta of the Bassac and Mekong Rivers. The area is covered almost entirely with swamps, marshes and rice fields. The shoreline is marked by long stretches of mangrove swamps, beyond which mud flats stretch for some distance at low tide. Nearly all of the Delta is less than 10 feet above sea level, and the rise and fall of the tide is noticeable in the rivers and canals throughout the area. The unimproved areas of forest, mangrove swamps, and jungle afford sanctuary to the enemy.
Weather	As in MR 3, the flying conditions in MR 4 were generally good during the quarter. Only two days were reported as poor, and 12 days as marginal, during the period; early morning fog and stratus interfered with operations, but not markedly. There was also some local shower activity during November and December.
Population	MR 4 has the largest population, with about six million (35 percent of the national total). The Delta is the major farming area and producer of rice.
GVN Control	Relatively secure (HES rating A, B, and C): hamlets 87.3 percent; population 93.2 percent.
Enemy Forces	Total number of enemy battalions declined by one during 4th Qtr CY 70. Maneuver strength dropped by nine percent; the figure of 29,202 reflects only maneuver battalions. The total enemy strength reported is 42,199. 7th Division TAOR, including Kien Hoa province, continued to have the second highest density in the Republic.
Friendly Forces	The 7th and 9th Division TAORs had the highest and second-highest friendly troop densities in country. Total friendly strength dropped about one percent; CIDG personnel converted to Border Ranger battalions during CY 70, and are included in the RF/PF totals.



# CONFIDENTIAL

## b. Enemy-Initiated Incidents.

(1) Enemy-initiated incidents against ARVN infantry battalions decreased to 190 this quarter; the downward trend started during the 2d Qtr CY 69 (Chart 5).

(2) Chart 6 illustrates the number of incidents directed against ARVN infantry units, by military region, during the last four quarters. Daytime incidents continued to constitute the major percentage of all incidents.

(a) Military Region 1. Enemy-initiated incidents decreased from last quarter. Of the 52 incidents reported, attacks by fire numbered 35, of which 31 were during the day. MR 1 experienced the greatest number of enemy-initiated incidents.

(b) Military Region 2. MR 2 experienced a sharp decline in enemy-initiated incidents this quarter. All incidents reported in MR 2 were in the 22d Division's TAOR.


(c) Military Region 3. MR 3 continued to experience a low number of enemy-initiated incidents. Units reported a total of 14 incidents, of which four were assaults and ambushes and 10 were attacks by fire. The majority of the attacks by fire were daylight.

(d) Military Region 4. Enemy-initiated incidents increased sharply this quarter, especially attacks by fire. The 9th Division accounted for only two of the 45 incidents reported.

(3) Annex B contains a detailed tabulation of enemy-initiated incidents.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 5




CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 6

# ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS

## AGAINST ARVN INFANTRY BNS



**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

## c. Contacts.


(1) Enemy contacts by ARVN infantry battalions country-wide increased from 1,771 in the 3d Qtr CY 70 to 2,097 during the fourth quarter (Chart 7). MR 1 experienced the greatest decrease in battalion size contacts, while MR 2 continued to report the least number of contacts of all MRs.

(2) The percent of contacts with enemy units of platoon size and smaller increased again this quarter from 77 percent to 88 percent of the total contacts. This denotes the enemy's increased reliance on the employment of small unit tactics throughout the battle area, as opposed to massing his forces into battalion size operations.

(3) Battalion size enemy contacts decreased slightly in the fourth quarter. Twenty-five percent of the battalion contacts were in Cambodia this quarter, while operations in the U Minh Forest and Seven Mountains area of MR 4 accounted for another 63 percent.

(4) Annex A contains a detailed tabulation of enemy contacts and results.

Chart 7



# CONFIDENTIAL

## d. Effort.

(1) Percent of Time on Missions Country-wide. Chart 8 shows the average battalion effort on missions country-wide for ARVN/VNMC organizations, and trends since January 1969. There was a slight increase in time spent on combat operations this quarter. Time spent on security and static pacification remained relatively the same as last quarter. Reserve, training, and rehabilitation time decreased because of an increase in combat operations.

(2) Percent of Time Spent on Missions Within Each Military Region. Chart 9 shows a comparison of time spent on each mission by ARVN infantry units (battalions, reconnaissance companies, organic cavalry squadrons) with an indication of the changes since last quarter.

(a) Military Region 1. Total time spent on combat operations decreased substantially this quarter, with most of the decrease going to an increase in active pacification. The 51st Regiment increased its time on active pacification from nine to 64 percent. The 2d Division increased its time on static pacification from five to 15 percent.

(b) Military Region 2. Overall combat operations by II Corps units increased substantially this quarter. All other categories of effort showed corresponding decreases. For over a year, however, the II Corps units have devoted the least amount of time to offensive operations (combat operations plus active pacification) of all the corps.

(c) Military Region 3. Time spent on combat operations decreased for the second straight quarter; however, III Corps units continued to devote more time to combat operations than any other military region. Security increased, while active pacification decreased slightly.

(d) Military Region 4. All IV Corps organizations increased their time on combat operations this quarter. All other categories of effort showed a corresponding decrease.

(3) Comparison of Time Spent on Missions by ARVN Infantry Battalions. Table 1 shows the major ARVN organizations with the most and least time spent on each mission by their organic infantry battalions. Complete data indicating time spent on each mission are contained in Annex C.

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 8





Chart 9



# CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF TIME SPENT ON MISSIONS BY ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>MOST TIME</u>	<u>LEAST TIME</u>
Combat Operations	1st Div (82%)	51st Regt (8%)
Security	51st Regt (23%)	25th Div (2%)
Active Pacification	51st Regt (61%)	1st, 9th, 18th Divs (0%)
Static Pacification	2d Div (13%)	1st, 5th, 7th 9th, 18th, 23d, and 25th Divs (0%)
Training	23d Div (19%)	25th Div (0.1%)
Reserve/Rehabilitation	21st Div (16%)	2d Div (1%)

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## e. Combined and Unilateral Combat Operations (Chart 10).

(1) The percent of time spent on combined (US/ARVN) combat operations by ARVN infantry battalions continued to decline this quarter. The number of unilateral operations increased, and maintained a high average for CY 70.


(2) Military Region 1. I Corps units decreased unilateral operations this quarter from 66 to 60 percent. The 1st Division registered 81 percent for unilateral operations. Combined operations increased this quarter to more than one percent. The 2d Division led in combined operations with two percent.

(3) Military Region 2. The II Corps units continue to spend the least amount of effort on unilateral operations. However, they led all units in combined operations with 2.4 percent this quarter. The 22d Division was high for II Corps units in unilateral operations, while the 23d Division led in combined operations.

(4) Military Region 3. III Corps units led all corps in time spent on unilateral operations. The 25th Division led III Corps units on unilateral operations, spending 79 percent of its effort in that area. No time was spent on combined operations with US forces, although there were some combined operations with Cambodian forces.

(5) Military Region 4. All combat operations by IV Corps units were unilateral since there were no US ground combat units in the Delta. IV Corps units devoted 59 percent of their effort to unilateral operations; the 9th Division led all MR 4 units in unilateral operations effort at 85 percent.

Chart 10





# CONFIDENTIAL


## f. Results.

(1) US and GVN Regular Forces Casualty Ratios. A comparison of US and GVN regular forces (ARVN/VNMC, VNAF and VNN) casualty ratios, which are made up of enemy eliminated (killed, captured, and surrendered) divided by friendly losses (killed, and missing), based on country-wide statistics (Measurement of Progress data), is shown in Chart 11. Both ratios increased significantly this quarter.

(2) Enemy Eliminated. Chart 12 shows the country-wide average battalion results achieved by ARVN/VNMC in terms of enemy eliminated. Enemy eliminated had established a gradual uptrend from 3d Qtr CY 69 through 1st Qtr CY 70. In 2d Qtr CY 70 it more than doubled because of the successful Cambodian operations and increased enemy activity in the Republic. Except for 2d Qtr CY 70 results, fourth quarter enemy eliminated continued the gradual uptrend. Friendly losses were lower than last quarter, and the casualty ratio reached a new high of 9.3:1. The 2d, 7th, and 21st Divisions and the 51st Regiment had the largest number of total enemy eliminated during the quarter. Chart 13 shows enemy eliminated per battalion for division and other major units.

(3) Weapons Captured. Chart 12 also shows that the number of weapons captured (excluding caches) per battalion decreased as did the number of weapons lost; however, the weapons ratio rose to the highest level in over two years. The 2d Division captured the largest number of weapons per battalion, followed by the 51st Regiment.


Chart 11



# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL


Chart 12



CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 13



▼ PREVIOUS QTR

# CONFIDENTIAL


# CONFIDENTIAL

## (4) Caches.

(a) Chart 14 indicates weapons found in caches by ARVN/VNMC units country-wide since 1st Qtr CY 69. The number of weapons found in caches increased slightly this quarter. The airborne and the 5th Division reported the largest finds of weapons. Twenty-eight percent of all cache weapons were found in Cambodia.

(b) The tonnage of food and ammunition found in caches is displayed in Chart 14 also. Seventy-four percent of these items were captured in Cambodia. The 22d Division accounted for 80 percent of this tonnage.

Chart 14



# CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Ambushes. Chart 15 depicts the number of ambushes conducted by organizations of each corps during the fourth quarter.


(a) Military Region 1. A total of 20,282 ambushes were conducted by I Corps units during the 4th Qtr CY 70. Seventy-four percent of these ambushes were conducted at night. The 1st Division conducted 627 ambushes per battalion.

(b) Military Region 2. II Corps units conducted a total of 28,005 ambushes, 89 percent of which were night operations. The 23d Division led in this area with an average of 1,031 ambushes per battalion.

(c) Military Region 3. A total of 15,695 ambushes were conducted by III Corps units during the quarter. Eighty-six percent of these ambushes were conducted at night. The 25th Division had 493 ambushes per battalion.

(d) Military Region 4. A total of 10,191 ambushes were carried out by IV Corps units. Ninety-two percent of these ambushes were conducted at night. The 7th Division had 458 ambushes per battalion.

Chart 15




CONFIDENTIAL

g. Combat Support.

(1) Country-wide. Chart 16 depicts combat support provided to ARVN/VNMC from 1st Qtr CY 70 through 4th Qtr CY 70, as reported by battalion advisors. All types of combat support decreased from the previous quarter. The percent of support attributable to RVNAF increased in all categories.

Chart 16



CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Chart 17 shows the combat support provided ARVN in each military region.

(a) Military Region 1. Combat support employed by I Corps battalions decreased in all three support categories. The percent of artillery support provided by RVNAF increased to 95 percent compared to 71 percent in the previous quarter. The 1st Division continued to receive the greatest amount of artillery support in MR 1. The 51st Regiment received the most helicopter lift support.

(b) Military Region 2. Except for artillery, there was an increase in combat support provided II Corps units. RVNAF resources provided 86 percent of the artillery support, an increase from last quarter. The 23d Division was the greater user of tactical air/helicopter gunship support. The 22d Division received the most artillery and helicopter lift support. RVNAF increased its combat support in tactical air/helicopter gunship by nine percent, but decreased its portion of helicopter lift support by 13 percent.

(c) Military Region 3. Combat support employed by III Corps battalions decreased in each category this quarter. The percent of tactical air/helicopter gunship support provided by RVNAF fell by four percent while artillery support increased by eight percent. For the fourth consecutive quarter, the 5th Division employed the greatest amount of artillery in MR 3.



(d) Military Region 4. Combat support provided IV Corps battalions continued to decrease in the helicopter lift category. RVNAF resources continued to provide 100 percent of the artillery support. The 9th Division received the greatest amount of artillery and helicopter lift support in ARVN/VNMC.

# CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

### Chart 17

## COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED ARVN INF (PER BN)



29

**CONFIDENTIAL**



CONFIDENTIAL


h. Operational Effectiveness Assessments.

(1) The US advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness are subjective evaluations of how well their units perform the mechanics of warfare, and are not necessarily indicative of the operational results achieved by those units, which are influenced also by the environment, enemy situation, combat support received, and mission assigned. The average operational effectiveness for the 4th Qtr CY 70 showed a substantial increase from the previous quarter, and is at an all time high. Chart 18 shows the trend in the ARVN/VNMC average since the 1st Qtr CY 69. The discontinuity in the 4th Qtr CY 69 was caused by a change in evaluations given some ARVN units by advisors in the revised SEER quarterly questionnaire.

(2) All ARVN/VNMC organizations recorded an improved operational effectiveness assessment except the 9th and 25th Divisions and the Marines. The 1st Division had the highest score, while the 9th Division was lowest of all units (Chart 19).

(3) Annex D contains detailed assessment tables derived from the quarterly questionnaire.


Chart 18



\* REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
IMPLEMENTED 4TH QUARTER.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 19



▼ PREVIOUS QUARTER

# CONFIDENTIAL

## i. Division, Regiment and Battalion Staff Element Evaluations.

(1) Chart 20 compares the effectiveness of division and regimental staff functions among the four military regions on a percentage scale, and Chart 21 contains the same information for infantry battalion staffs. Ratings were computed for selected staff sections, the command and control function, and an overall command and staff average. A staff element, such as G1/S1, can be compared between military regions because advisors answered the same set of questions. Different staff elements cannot be directly compared because the ratings are based upon different sets of questions. The battalions have experienced greater difficulty in staff operations than divisions and regiments and are therefore portrayed separately. Staff element problem areas are analyzed by specific function in paragraph 4e.

(2) Regiments/Divisions (Chart 20). In the 4th Qtr CY 70, MR 1 staffs again received the highest overall rating and improved from the previous quarter. MR 2 staffs exhibited gains for every staff function except G4/S4, and are above average in every category. MR 3 staffs improved in all areas except G1/S1. MR 4 was below average in each area and had the lowest overall rating of all regions.

(3) Infantry Battalions (Chart 21). MR 1 battalion staffs showed improvement from the previous quarter in all functions; their overall rating was above average. MR 2 staffs showed an overall increase from the third quarter. MR 3 staffs had a substantial increase in all areas, and were highest in the overall rating. MR 4 battalion staffs dropped and were below average in all categories; they had the lowest overall rating.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 20





Chart 21



CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL



## j. Summary of ARVN/VNMC Performance Indicators.

(1) Chart 22 displays the comparative standings of the major ARVN/VNMC organizations according to five selected performance indicators. These five indicators are plotted around the ARVN/VNMC average on a scale determined by the distances by which the various indicators depart from the average. The chart is separated into three zones--above average, average, and below average. Minor variations within each zone are not considered significant, although some major differences can be observed within the above average and below average zones. Also shown in the last column are the 3d Qtr CY 70 ARVN/VNMC indicator averages, which demonstrate the overall change in results achieved this quarter. Organic reconnaissance companies and armored cavalry squadrons are included in division totals, hence many armored cavalry units are included in two organizations--their individual divisions and total cavalry. This duplication was not included in computing the averages, however. The chart does not consider all the ramifications involved in a total evaluation nor does it give more weight to one performance indicator over another. A commander, in comparing relative standings of organizations, may place more weight or importance on one performance indicator than another based on his professional judgment, and rank units accordingly. However, based on indicators of equal weight, the 7th and 23d Divisions were the overall top performers and the 5th Division and Rangers were the low performers for 4th Qtr CY 70.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 22

## ARVN/VNMC PERFORMANCE INDICATORS



EN ELIM/  
BN

WPNS CPTR/  
BN

CASUALTY  
RATIO

EN ELIM  
HR CONTACT

WPNS CPTR/  
EN ELIM

# CONFIDENTIAL

## k. Evaluation of Operational Performance of Infantry Divisions, Separate Regiments, and Special Organizations.

(1) General. The foregoing evaluations were primarily at corps or country-wide level. In order to provide a more detailed evaluation of the operational performance of ARVN and VNM units, the following pages present charts and texts for each of the divisions, separate regiments, and special organizations (airborne, ranger, armored cavalry, and Marines). Organic reconnaissance company and cavalry squadron results are included in division totals.



(2) Techniques. The evaluations are based primarily on fourth quarter and yearly trends in operational performance data. For each organization's evaluation, the discussion is organized in terms of environment, effort, combat support, results, operational effectiveness, leadership, and trends. Enemy density is based on the total estimate of maneuver unit strength plus guerrilla strength. In order to compensate for substantial differences in the number of battalions in a division or regiment, equivalent battalion figures are used for some indicators. The total number of equivalent battalions in an organization is obtained by adding together the number of infantry battalions, the armored cavalry squadron equated to a battalion, and the number of reconnaissance companies equated to a quarter battalion each. The number of equivalent battalions in Cambodia is obtained by dividing the number of battalion-days spent in Cambodia by 92, the number of days in the fourth quarter.

(3) Charts. The evaluation of each organization is illustrated by a chart containing combat support received, opportunity (hours of contact), results, and its operational effectiveness assessment. For those organizations which operated in Cambodia, two bars are used to indicate performance: the wide bars on the left show overall performance during the entire quarter, with those portions achieved in the Republic and in Cambodia separately identified; the narrow bars on the right indicate the relative efficiency of those units while involved in cross-border operations. An average zone is shown for each measure; variations within this zone are not considered significant and are termed "average". In addition, yearly trends are depicted for enemy eliminated, casualty ratio, advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership, and percent of effort on all missions.

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 23





# CONFIDENTIAL

## 1ST DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 1st Division's TAOR showed a slight increase from the third quarter with the addition of a sapper battalion and remained the highest in country at 2.24 per square kilometer. Friendly density decreased from 6.3 to 5.9 per square kilometer as a US maneuver battalion was redeployed.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations by the 1st Division decreased, dropping from 81 percent in the third quarter to 76 percent in the fourth quarter. Reserve and rehabilitation time continued low at one percent, with time devoted to training staying at four percent of the total effort. The 1st Division, like all I Corps units, did not participate in the Cambodian operations.

Combat Support. The division showed a decline this quarter in the use of all types of combat support. Artillery support was in the average zone, while tactical air, helicopter gunship and helicopter lift support were all below average.


Results. The 1st Division's hours of contact dropped from 31 hours per battalion, highest in country in the third quarter, to just under 5 hours per battalion, second lowest in country this quarter. Enemy eliminated per battalion displayed the same pattern -- from highest to next to the bottom. Weapons captured per battalion dropped from highest in the Republic to below average. The division did better in the performance ratios; however, the casualty ratio and enemy eliminated per hour of contact were in the average zone, while weapons captured per enemy eliminated was second best of all ARVN/VNMC organizations. The division had the fewest friendly losses per battalion, but the highest percent of friendly KIA from mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Advisors still thought highly of the 1st Division as the operational effectiveness and leadership assessments both improved this quarter, and were highest of all ARVN/VNMC organizations




Trends. The performance of the 1st Division, which led all ARVN/VNMC organizations during the third quarter, dropped markedly this quarter as all performance measures fell off. Only the assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership remained high. A contributing factor to the low performance may have been the exceptionally heavy rainfall during the monsoon season. The 1st Division has been one of the most effective organizations in ARVN/VNMC, and it is believed that this down-trend is only temporary.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 24






TRENDS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART OBTAINED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 68

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



RESERVE TRAINING REHABILITATION

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 2D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density per square kilometer in the 2d Division's TAOR reversed its downward trend and rose from 1.03 in the third quarter to 1.13 for the fourth quarter. Friendly density remained at 4.8 per square kilometer.

Effort. The division devoted 59 percent of its time to offensive operations in the fourth quarter, which was a decrease of approximately six percent from the third quarter. Training time also decreased, while time on security declined from 21 to 19 percent. The 2d Division devoted more time to static pacification, 15 percent, than any other ARVN/VNMC organization. The 2d Division, like all I Corps units, did not operate in Cambodia during the fourth quarter.

Combat Support. All categories of combat support decreased this quarter. Artillery support and helicopter lift sorties were in the average zone, while tactical air and helicopter gunship sorties were below average.


Results. The 2d Division led all ARVN/VNMC organizations in enemy eliminated and weapons captured per battalion, and in casualty ratio. Hours of contact was also well above average. The division suffered heavy losses from mines and booby traps (61 percent of all their friendly KIA), second only to the 1st Division.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Both the operational effectiveness and leadership assessments improved from the third quarter and were in the average zones.


Trends. All 2d Division trend lines turned upward this quarter, as it led all ARVN/VNMC organizations in most performance measures. The division should continue to be one of the best performers in ARVN/VNMC.

# CONFIDENTIAL


Chart 25



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



# CONFIDENTIAL

## 51ST REGIMENT

Environment. Enemy density decreased this quarter to 1.14 per square kilometer, with the departure of an NVA battalion. Friendly density increased slightly to 4.8 per square kilometer.

Effort. The 51st Regiment spent 64 percent of its effort in support of active pacification, tops in the Republic. Conversely, the regiment spent the least amount of time on combat operations, seven percent. Time devoted to security decreased from 51 percent in the third quarter to 19 percent this quarter. The 51st Regiment did not go into Cambodia.

Combat Support. All categories of combat support increased from last quarter. Artillery support and tactical air and helicopter gunship support were in the average zone, while helicopter lift support was above average.


Results. Hours of contact per battalion decreased from the third quarter and was in the average zone. The 51st Regiment used this opportunity well, however, as enemy eliminated and weapons captured per battalion were third and second best in ARVN/VNMC respectively. The regiment also had the third highest friendly losses per battalion, so that its casualty ratio was only average. It had the second best record for enemy eliminated per hour of contact in country.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership increased this quarter, and were both above average. The operational effectiveness assessment was second best in ARVN/VNMC.


Trends. The 51st Regiment's overall results were up in comparison to the third quarter and were above the ARVN/VNMC average. The shift from security to offensive missions has led to improved performance. The 51st Regiment had great success during the fourth quarter, but its performance has been so erratic in the past that only time will tell if this improvement is permanent.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 26




TRENDS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ..... LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



SECURITY ..... STATIC PAC  
RESERVE ..... TRAINING ..... REHABILITATION

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 22D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 22d Division's TAOR remained constant at .52 per square kilometer and was third lowest in the Republic. Friendly density dropped to 2.2 per square kilometer with the reduction of three maneuver battalions.

Effort. The 22d Division devoted 55 percent of its time to offensive operations. Approximately 28 percent of its total time was spent on security operations. The division's organic cavalry squadron spent virtually all of its time on road security. Elements of the division spent 33 battalion-days in Cambodia.

Combat Support. Artillery support decreased this quarter but was in the average zone. Tactical air and helicopter gunship support increased and was also in the average zone. Helicopter lift support increased and was above average.


Results. The 22d Division was above average or in the average zone for all performance measures during the fourth quarter. Hours of contact, enemy eliminated and weapons captured per battalion all increased and were in the average zone. A below average number of friendly losses led to the third best casualty ratio in ARVN/VNMC. The enemy eliminated per hour of contact and weapons captured per enemy eliminated ratios were also in the average zones.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership increased over last quarter and were in the average zone.




Trends. All performance indicators improved this quarter as the 22d Division obtained a position as an average ARVN/VNMC organization, after being one of the poorer performers the last several quarters.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 27






TRENDS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ..... LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEEN QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 68

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



RESERVE ..... TRAINING ..... REHABILITATION

# CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

## 23D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density remained constant at .25 per square kilometer. Friendly density also remained constant at 1.5 per square kilometer. The 23d Division's TAOR has the largest area and lowest enemy and friendly densities in the Republic.

Effort. The division's time devoted to offensive operations increased but remained below average. Time spent on training increased and remained significantly high with a resultant decrease in security missions. The 23d Division spent more time on training during the fourth quarter than any other ARVN/VNMC organization. Elements of the division spent 21 battalion-days in Cambodia.

Combat Support. Artillery and helicopter lift support decreased this quarter, with artillery support being below the average zone. Tactical air and helicopter gunship support increased and was in the average zone.


Results. The division increased its hours of contact this quarter but was still below average. It made good use of this opportunity, however, as all its performance measures improved and were average or above. The 23d Division had the second best casualty ratio and best enemy eliminated per hour of contact of all ARVN/VNMC organizations. Their performance rates in Cambodia were even better than in the Republic.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership increased significantly over last quarter but were in the average zone.




Trends. All trend lines moved upward this quarter as the 23d Division established itself as a leading performer in ARVN/VNMC. During the past several quarters the division had been a substandard performer, and more time is needed to see if this improvement is permanent.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 28






TRENDS



NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 5TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 5th Division's TAOR decreased to .57 per square kilometer. Friendly density decreased to 3.9 per square kilometer as three US maneuver battalions were redeployed.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations by the 5th Division fell from 72 to 68 percent, while time on security rose from 15 to 22 percent. Elements of the division spent 178 battalion-days in Cambodia during the fourth quarter.

Combat Support. The 5th Division used less combat support during the fourth quarter, and was above average in its use of artillery while in the average zones for numbers of tactical air, helicopter gunship, and helicopter lift sorties.

Results. The 5th Division continued to perform below the ARVN/VNMC average. The Division was lowest in enemy eliminated, and was next to lowest in weapons captured and enemy eliminated per hour of contact. However, it had the most weapons captured per enemy eliminated in country, and led ARVN/VNMC in weapons found in caches. Forty percent of friendly KIA were from mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The 5th Division's operational effectiveness and leadership assessments improved this quarter and are now in the average zone.

Trends. Although remaining one of ARVN/VNMC's poorer performers, the 5th Division improved in every performance measure this quarter as all trend lines turned upward.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 5TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 5th Division's TAOR decreased to .57 per square kilometer. Friendly density decreased to 3.9 per square kilometer as three US maneuver battalions were redeployed.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations by the 5th Division fell from 72 to 68 percent, while time on security rose from 15 to 22 percent. Elements of the division spent 178 battalion-days in Cambodia during the fourth quarter.

Combat Support. The 5th Division used less combat support during the fourth quarter, and was above average in its use of artillery while in the average zones for numbers of tactical air, helicopter gunship, and helicopter lift sorties.

Results. The 5th Division continued to perform below the ARVN/VNMC average. The Division was lowest in enemy eliminated, and was next to lowest in weapons captured and enemy eliminated per hour of contact. However, it had the most weapons captured per enemy eliminated in country, and led ARVN/VNMC in weapons found in caches. Forty percent of friendly KIA were from mines and booby traps.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The 5th Division's operational effectiveness and leadership assessments improved this quarter and are now in the average zone.

Trends. Although remaining one of ARVN/VNMC's poorer performers, the 5th Division improved in every performance measure this quarter as all trend lines turned upward.


# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL






Chart 29



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEEN QUESTIONNAIRE EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 18TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 18th Division's TAOR increased to .44 per square kilometer and was second lowest in the Republic. Friendly density dropped to 4.2 per square kilometer.

Effort. The 18th Division's percent of time on combat operations declined to 63 percent, with little effort being spent in support of pacification. The division continued to devote only a small amount of time to security (14 percent), as the RF/PF performed much of this mission. Elements of the 18th spent a total of 624 battalion-days in Cambodia, highest of all ARVN/VNMC units; this represented 49 percent of the division's total effort.

Combat Support. All categories of combat support decreased from the third quarter. The bulk of artillery support was used in Cambodia at a below average rate. The division used the second least amount of helicopter lift and the least amount of tactical air and helicopter gunship support in ARVN/VNMC.



Results. The number of hours of contact per battalion decreased from the third quarter, but all other performance measures improved this quarter. The casualty ratio was just below the average zone, the number of enemy eliminated was in the average zone, and all other performance measures--weapons captured per battalion, weapons captured per enemy eliminated, and enemy eliminated per hour of contact--were above average. All performance measures in Cambodia were better than those achieved in the Republic. The 18th Division lost only three percent of their friendly KIA to mines and booby traps, the best mark in ARVN/VNMC.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness assessment of the 18th Division increased substantially this quarter, and was above average. The leadership assessment also increased, and was in the average zone.

Trends. All performance measures improved this quarter as the 18th Division regained its position among the top ARVN/VNMC performers after slipping somewhat during the third quarter.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 30



# CONFIDENTIAL

## 25TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 25th Division's TAOR increased slightly to 1.73 per square kilometer, third highest in the Republic, with the addition of a sapper battalion. Friendly density dropped to 7.3 as US units continued to redeploy.

Effort. The 25th Division's effort was mainly devoted to offensive operations, a category in which it led all ARVN/VNMC organizations. A substantial portion of these operations, moreover, was devoted to active support of pacification. Elements of the 25th spent a total of 548 battalion-days in Cambodia, second highest of all ARVN/VNMC organizations. Only one of its infantry battalions failed to see action in Cambodia during the fourth quarter.

Combat Support. The 25th Division used slightly more artillery support than in the third quarter, but was still the second lowest user in ARVN/VNMC. It used less tactical air, helicopter gunship, and helicopter lift support than last quarter. The division reported using little artillery and no air support in Cambodia.

Results. Hours of contact, enemy eliminated and weapons captured per battalion remained near the third quarter marks and were in the average zones. Friendly losses dropped dramatically, however, so that the casualty ratio more than doubled. All performance measures were better in Cambodia than in the Republic. Only its enemy eliminated per hour of contact ratio was below average, while its weapons captured per enemy eliminated ratio was above the average zone.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Both the operational effectiveness and leadership assessments remained near their third quarter marks and within the average zones.



Trends. Only the casualty ratio trend line showed substantial improvement this quarter, as all others remained relatively constant. During the past year, the 25th Division had emerged as one of ARVN's best divisions, but it produced only average results in the third and fourth quarters.

# CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 31



CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 7TH DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density, 1.88 per square kilometer, was second highest in the Republic though it decreased from last quarter. Friendly density remained highest in country, although it declined to 12.4 per square kilometer.

Effort. The percent of time devoted to offensive operations increased to 68 percent, while security missions dropped to 24 percent of the division's effort. The division operated almost entirely within its TAOR during the fourth quarter.

Combat Support. The 7th Division used less of each type of combat support this quarter. Nevertheless, its use of artillery was second highest in ARVN/VNMC. The division used less than half of the third quarter amounts of tactical air, helicopter gunship and helicopter lift support.



Results. All 7th Division performance measures were above average except for its weapons captured per enemy eliminated ratio, which was lowest in ARVN/VNMC. Hours of contact, enemy eliminated and casualty ratio all registered slight declines from last quarter, but the enemy eliminated was second best in country. Forty-five percent of friendly KIA were from mines and booby traps, a significant improvement over last quarter when the figure was 60 percent.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Both the operational effectiveness and leadership assessments increased this quarter and were in the average zone.

Trends. The numbers of enemy eliminated and weapons captured decreased from the third quarter. The 7th Division's casualty ratio, on an uptrend for the three previous quarters, dropped slightly during the fourth quarter. The division continued to suffer a high rate of casualties from mines and booby traps. The 7th Division maintained its position as one of ARVN's best organizations during the quarter.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 32



# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 9TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 9th Division's TAOR decreased to .79 per square kilometer. Friendly density declined to 8.7 per square kilometer, but remained second highest in the Republic.

Effort. Time on combat operations increased during the quarter to 82 percent, highest in country. Time on security fell from 12 to six percent. Elements of the 9th Division spent 40 battalion-days in Cambodia.

Combat Support. The 9th Division increased its use of artillery, tactical air, and helicopter gunship support; it used more artillery than any other ARVN/VNMC organization. The division used less helicopter lift than last quarter, yet still an average amount.


Results. The 9th Division's hours of contact more than doubled and was highest in country. However, the numbers of weapons captured and enemy eliminated per battalion decreased and were in the average zone. The division had the greatest number of friendly losses in ARVN/VNMC, which resulted in the lowest casualty ratio in the Republic. The large number of hours of contact led to the lowest enemy eliminated per hour of contact ratio.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Both the operational effectiveness and leadership assessments dropped sharply this quarter and were lowest of all ARVN/VNMC organizations.




Trends. Following its 2d Qtr CY 70 outstanding performance, the 9th Division has been on a steep downtrend in weapons captured, enemy eliminated and casualty ratio. The operational effectiveness and leadership evaluations have declined for four straight quarters. The 9th Division has slipped from its position as a leading performer in ARVN/VNMC.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 33






TRENDS



NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED DEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 21ST DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 21st Division's TAOR decreased to .62 per square kilometer. Friendly density also declined to 3.4 per square kilometer with the reduction of one maneuver battalion.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations increased from 46 to 54 percent. The 21st Division spent the second most time on stat. pacification of all ARVN/VNMC units. Each battalion spends one week out of four on stand-down. Elements of the division spent 36 battalion-days in Cambodia.

Combat Support. The 21st Division used less of all types of combat support this quarter. However, it used the second greatest amount of tactical air and helicopter gunship sorties, and the greatest amount of helicopter lift in ARVN/VNMC. Its use of artillery was average.



Results. The 21st Division's hours of contact increased substantially as it moved into the U Minh Forest. Its number of enemy eliminated per battalion was well above average, and it had the second highest number of enemy KIA in country. However, the second highest number of friendly losses resulted in a below average casualty ratio. The division captured fewer weapons per battalion this quarter than last, but was still above the average zone. Its other performance ratios--weapons captured per enemy eliminated and enemy eliminated per hour of contact--were below average.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Both the operational effectiveness and leadership evaluations improved this quarter, but both were below the average zones.

Trends. The trend lines of the 21st Division have been fluctuating throughout 1970. The division continues to maintain a position near the ARVN/VNMC average.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 34



CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## AIRBORNE DIVISION

Environment. The Airborne Division, consisting of nine battalions, continued to operate principally in MR 3 this quarter. In December, an airborne brigade of three battalions was committed on a relief expedition to Cambodia.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations increased to 50 percent following last quarter's all time low. The division spent 22 percent of its time in reserve and rehabilitation, tops in ARVN/VNMC, and 19 percent on security missions. Elements of the division spent 44 battalion-days in Cambodia.

Combat Support. All categories of combat support more than doubled this quarter, and were above the average zones. The Airborne Division used the most tactical air and helicopter gunship support in ARVN/VNMC. All support rates were greater in Cambodia than in the Republic.

Results. Most of the Airborne Division's results were achieved by the three battalions in Cambodia. Total hours of contact decreased this quarter and was below average, as did weapons captured per battalion. The number of enemy eliminated per battalion increased from last quarter, but was also below average. The second lowest number of friendly losses resulted in an improved casualty ratio and placed them in the average zone. The other performance ratios--enemy eliminated per hour of contact and weapons captured per enemy eliminated--were below average. In Cambodia, the airborne performed at a better rate than in country.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Both the operational effectiveness assessment and the leadership assessment dropped this quarter, but both were above average. The leadership score was second highest in ARVN/VNMC.


Trends. The trend lines for the airborne division varied this quarter, with enemy eliminated and casualty ratio moving upward and weapons captured, operational effectiveness and leadership moving downward. The airborne's performance has been erratic and future improvement cannot be predicted.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 35

**ENEMY ELIM BY AIRBORNE BATTALIONS**




**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 36

ENEMY ELIM BY  
ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS





63

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 37



# CONFIDENTIAL

## ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

Environment. The 17 cavalry squadrons are employed throughout the four military regions; one squadron is organic to each of the 10 divisions and the remaining seven operate under corps control. Six squadrons from MRS 3 and 4 spent 275 battalion-days in Cambodia.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations decreased, as did time spent on security. The armored cavalry spent more time on security than other ARVN/VNMC organizations, however. Time devoted to training increased substantially, and was second highest in country.

Combat Support. Artillery support decreased but remained in the average zone; tactical air and helicopter gunship support also decreased and was below average. As usual, the armored cavalry used a negligible amount of helicopter lift.


Results. All performance measures decreased from last quarter. Hours of contact, enemy eliminated and casualty ratio were in the average zones, while weapons captured, enemy eliminated per hour of contact and weapons captured per enemy eliminated were below average. The cavalry expended 18 percent of their effort in Cambodia this quarter, where they achieved 80 percent of their results.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership increased this quarter and remained in the average zones.


Trends. Enemy eliminated decreased, but did not fall below the 1st Qtr CY 70 level; the casualty ratio remained high. The operational effectiveness and leadership assessments have been on a steady uptrend for the last four quarters. The cavalry has slipped back to the below-average position among ARVN/VNMC organizations it held before the Cambodian operations began last spring. The performance of the five squadrons operating in Cambodia this quarter, especially the 18th ACS, demonstrated that the cavalry is still a potent fighting force when used in offensive operations.

# CONFIDENTIAL






Chart 38



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 68

RESERVE TRAINING REHABILITATION

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMCM)

Environment. During the fourth quarter, Marine units operated in Cambodia, MR 1, MR 3, and MR 4. They spent 348 battalion-days, 43 percent of their total effort, in Cambodia.

Effort. Marines continued to spend a high proportion of time (79 percent) on combat operations. They spent the second most time on reserve and rehabilitation (17 percent) of all ARVN/VNMC organizations.

Combat Support. Marine units reported less use of combat support this quarter than the previous quarter. These reduced figures may be misleading, however, since battalions operating in Cambodia reported using no combat support. Consequently, the Marines were below the average zones in all support categories.

Results. All performance indicators were down from the third quarter. Enemy eliminated and weapons captured per battalion were below average, while all ratios--casualty ratio, enemy eliminated per hour of contact, and weapons captured per enemy eliminated--were in the average zones. Results obtained in Cambodia were not appreciably better than those obtained in the Republic. The number of friendly KIA due to mines and booby traps jumped from nine to 29 percent.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness assessment decreased this quarter and was below average. The leadership assessment improved from last quarter and was in the average zone.

Trends. All VNMC trend lines were down this quarter except for leadership. Their operational effectiveness rating has been on a down trend since 4th Qtr CY 69. Marine units achieved results slightly below the ARVN/VNMC average this quarter.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 39

**ENEMY ELIM BY MARINE BATTALIONS**




**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 40

ENEMY ELIM BY RANGER BATTALIONS




CONFIDENTIAL




CONFIDENTIAL






Chart 41



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS   LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 68

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## RANGERS

Environment. The Ranger Command expanded extensively as the 20 ranger maneuver battalions were joined by 37 ranger border defense battalions, which were converted from CIDG. This report concerns only the 20 maneuver battalions since complete statistics are not available for the border defense battalions. The 20 maneuver battalions are located throughout the four military regions. Nine of these battalions spent a total of 230 battalion-days in Cambodia this quarter.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations increased but was still below average. Time devoted to security missions decreased from 27 to 20 percent. Training time remained constant at seven percent and was above average.

Combat Support. Artillery support increased from last quarter and was in the average zone. Tactical air and helicopter gunship support increased and was above average. Helicopter lift support decreased but was second highest in ARVN/VNMC.

Results. Hours of contact increased slightly and was in the average zone. All performance measures were below average; the rangers had the lowest number of weapons captured per battalion and the second lowest casualty ratio in ARVN/VNMC. Performance rates were better in Cambodia than in the Republic as the rangers achieved approximately half of their operational results there with 13 percent of their total effort.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Both the operational effectiveness assessment and the leadership assessment improved this quarter, but both were below average. The operational effectiveness assessment was second lowest of all ARVN/VNMC organizations.

Trends. The enemy eliminated and weapons captured trend lines continued their down trends. The casualty ratio trend line, which has been erratic, turned upward this quarter. Operational effectiveness and leadership remained low. The rangers were among the poorer performers in ARVN/VNMC this quarter.


# CONFIDENTIAL

## 4. (C-NOFORN) ARVN/VNMC Problem Areas.

a. General. Major objectives of SEER are to identify weaknesses and problem areas which reduce combat effectiveness and, through analytical methods, determine courses of action by which RVNAF, with MACV assistance, may increase the effectiveness of their forces. This section contains major problem areas reported by senior advisors to ARVN units. In addition, this section contains major problems highlighted in the MACV analysis of ARVN/VNMC organizations.


b. Infantry Battalion Strength. Overall ARVN/VNMC strength increased by approximately 1,500 during the fourth quarter to 428,000, approximately 19,000 below the authorized level (Chart 42). Personnel in the pipeline decreased by 18 percent to 75,000 with over 41,000 in training schools. The large number in the pipeline continued to limit the personnel available in combat organizations. Chart 43 shows the authorized and average assigned strength of ARVN infantry battalions by division. The total assigned strength of ARVN infantry battalions remained constant during the fourth quarter, and was 26 percent below authorized levels. The 23d Division had the lowest assigned strength, with a shortfall of 32 percent.

Chart 42



# CONFIDENTIAL


Chart 43



## c. Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps.

(1) Mine and booby trap casualties continued to be a serious problem in ARVN/VNMC. In the fourth quarter, deaths from mines and booby traps increased and, since total friendly KIA decreased, the percent of total casualties from these devices increased substantially. Chart 44 depicts the magnitude of the problem during the last eight quarters.

Chart 44




# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Chart 45 presents data on this problem for each major organization. The problem has been most acute for MR 1 and MR 4 units; over half of all friendly deaths in MR 1 were from mines and booby traps, while MR 4 credited one death in three to these devices. A high percentage of friendly KIA from mines and booby traps was recorded by the 1st, 2d, 5th, 7th and 21st Divisions, and the armored cavalry.

Chart 45



▼ PREVIOUS QTR AVG

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## d. Battalion Problem Areas.

(1) During the fourth quarter, advisors to the ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions and armored cavalry squadrons submitted responses to questions contained in the MACV SEER Questionnaire which indicated potential problem areas. Chart 46 depicts the percent of advisors that indicated their units performed inadequately in selected areas. The percentages are based on the frequency of responses from approximately 370 questionnaires. SEER problem area evaluations include only battalions, since the areas of concern are based on problems which exist primarily at that level. Certain problems show noticeable differences between ARVN infantry battalions and special units (airborne, cavalry, Marines, and rangers) and, while not indicated on the chart, these are noted in the comments below. The problem areas in the order they appear on Chart 46 are as follows:

(2) Inadequate Dependent Housing. Dependent housing has been a continual concern of ARVN, and major efforts to improve its quantity and quality are being made. Conditions have improved from the 4th Qtr CY 69, but 70 percent of advisors still considered the amount of housing to be inadequate, and 51 percent reported the quality as inadequate. Special units reported slightly less problems in dependent housing than ARVN infantry battalions.

(3) Reinforcement. Nineteen percent of the advisors reported that their units failed to reinforce elements in contact with adequate speed and with sufficient strength half of the time or more, an improvement from the previous quarter. The problem was not as serious in special units as in ARVN infantry battalions.



(4) Intelligence. The intelligence function in ARVN battalions has presented major problems as indicated by the responses concerning timeliness, collection efforts and security leaks. Forty-nine percent of advisors reported that the intelligence received by the unit was untimely 50 percent or more of the time during the fourth quarter. Efforts to collect intelligence were judged inadequate in 13 percent of the units; the special unit percentage was greater than that of ARVN infantry. While not displayed on the chart, it was noted that advisors reported most units as reacting appropriately to available intelligence most of the time, with 19 percent reporting it as a problem. There was reason to believe that the enemy was sometimes forewarned on the unit's combat operations by security leaks. Approximately 27 percent of the advisors reported this area as a problem, with the percentage in ARVN infantry organizations being less than that of special units.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 46-I

BATTALION PROBLEM AREAS  
PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS




..... MANEUVER BATTALIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 46-II

BATTALION PROBLEM AREAS  
PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS





# CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Leadership. Eight percent of the advisors reported that NCO leadership capability was a problem. Company grade officer leadership ability was also reported as inadequate by three percent of the advisors during the fourth quarter. The leadership problem was greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(6) Desertions. Desertions are a continuing problem in ARVN, and have been receiving command emphasis. However, unit commanders' actions designed to cope with the desertion problem were reported to be inadequate in eight percent of the ARVN maneuver battalions. The problem was not as great in special units.

(7) Aggressiveness. Seven percent of the advisors reported that units fought aggressively one-half of the time or less, which was an improvement from the previous quarter. This problem was greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(8) Indecisive Actions. Some unit commanders failed to take decisive action when the opportunity arose. Approximately 11 percent of the advisors reported this occurred 50 percent or more of the time in the fourth quarter, with the problem being the same in ARVN infantry battalions and in special units.

(9) Repair Parts Availability. The availability of repair parts was reported to be inadequate in a large number of units. This problem was particularly serious in artillery battalions and armored cavalry squadrons, where some mission essential equipment was deadlined for lack of repair parts. Advisors reported that the supply system has been distorted by failure of units to properly requisition items. In those portions of Chart 46 dealing with repair parts unavailability and untimely requisitions, artillery units have been added and cavalry squadrons portrayed separately from other maneuver battalions to emphasize the seriousness of this problem in those units. The artillery and cavalry showed significant regression in the availability of repair parts this quarter. The artillery also regressed significantly in requisitioning, while the cavalry improved in this area. Other maneuver battalions improved slightly in both areas.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## e. Staff Problem Areas.

(1) Chart 47 covers selected staff functions reported as inadequate in the SEER questionnaire by advisors to ARVN/VNMC organizations. The problem area functions are grouped separately by maneuver battalion staffs, and by regiment, group, brigade and division staffs, since battalions usually have experienced greater difficulty in staff operations than higher units. While the analysis includes all staff functions for completeness, the G1/S1 and most of the G4/S4 functions appear to be operating effectively due to the low number of advisors reporting these as problems.

(2) G1/S1 Functions. The personnel and morale functions of battalion staffs have shown mixed improvement during the last quarter, with a slight regression being reported for higher staffs. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings for the G1/S1 section in the following categories:

(a) Maintains organization strength, keeps records, and arranges for replacements.

(b) Supervises personnel management by classifying, assigning, promoting and transferring troops.

(c) Develops and maintains morale through personnel services, decorations and awards, and graves registration.

(3) G2/S2 Functions. The intelligence functions for all staffs have shown almost no improvement since the 4th Qtr CY 69. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G2/S2 section in the following categories:

(a) Supervises, coordinates, and plans intelligence collection activities.

(b) Processes intelligence information through recording, evaluation and interpretation, and disseminates intelligence.


(c) Plans and supervises counterintelligence activities.

(4) G3/S3 Functions. The operations and training functions have shown erratic behavior since the 4th Qtr CY 69. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G3/S3 section in the following categories:


CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 47-I

GI/SI AND G2/S2 STAFF FUNCTION PROBLEM AREAS  
PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS  
GI/SI



G2/S2




.....MANEUVER BATTALION STAFFS ———REGIMENT/GROUP/BRIGADE/DIVISION STAFFS

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 47-II

G3/S3 AND G4/S4 STAFF PROBLEM AREAS  
PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS  
83 / 83



84 / 84



..... MANEUVER BATTALION STAFFS — REGIMENT/GROUP/BRIGADE/DIVISION STAFFS

# CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Analyzes missions, recommends priorities for utilization of manpower and equipment, and recommends requirements for tables of equipment and organization.

(b) Analyzes the training situation and proposes and implements training programs.

(c) Analyzes the tactical situation, develops courses of action, and makes recommendations to the commander for operations.

(5) G4/S4 Functions. The logistics functions show little improvement since the 4th Qtr CY 69, with both levels of staff regressing in maintenance. The chart presents percentages of inadequate rating of the G4/S4 section in the following categories:

(a) Determines requirements for, procures, stores and allocates supplies.

(b) Makes provision for adequate medical support.

(c) Formulates, coordinates and supervises maintenance and repair programs.


f. Training Assessment. Training programs continue to receive emphasis in developing ARVN/VNMC effectiveness.

(1) Training Effectiveness. The 4th Qtr CY 70 training effectiveness evaluations presented in Chart 48 are based on advisors' responses to 16 different questions on frequency of training programs, results from training programs, and the manner in which training programs are conducted. MR 1 and MR 2 organizations displayed an overall improvement from the previous quarter, and were above the ARVN/VNMC average. MR 3 units also improved this quarter, but were still below average. MR 4 regressed from the previous quarter and were below average. All special units improved this quarter, so that the overall ARVN/VNMC assessment was higher than for the third quarter.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 48



# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Training at Division Training Schools and National Training Centers (Chart 49). The quality of training at division training schools and National Training Centers improved markedly. Advisors reported improvement since the previous quarter, and only 14 percent rate such training to be in the "poor" category.

(3) Training to Reduce Casualties (Chart 49). Training to reduce casualties has been separated into two categories: mine and booby trap casualties, and casualties from other causes. The number of advisors reporting the quality of training to reduce mine and booby trap casualties as "poor" decreased slightly to 23 percent. Reports rating the training to reduce other casualties as "poor" decreased to 14 percent. Both categories, however, showed a slight decrease in the amount of "good" quality training.

(4) Training of Officers and NCOs (Chart 49). The evaluation of the quality of training received by company grade officers and unit NCOs shows a slight regression this quarter. The number of advisors reporting "poor" quality training decreased to 22 percent for officer training and increased to 33 percent for NCO training. The quantity of in-place leadership and responsibility training received by company grade officers and unit NCOs decreased from the third quarter.

(5) Training to Improve Combat Skills (Chart 49). The quality of training to improve combat skills has improved slightly from the third quarter, and the quantity of such training has increased substantially. During the fourth quarter, 22 percent of the advisors reported this training to be "poor", and there was a reduction from 48 to 41 percent who stated their units conducted such training for 30 hours or less during the entire quarter.

(6) Marksmanship Training (Chart 49). The quality of marksmanship training declined this quarter, and 29 percent of the advisors rated the training as "poor." The amount of marksmanship training increased since the previous quarter. The number of units receiving no marksmanship training decreased from 16 to 10 percent.


# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL


Chart 49

## ADVISORS' ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING


### QUALITY OF TRAINING:



### COMPANY GRADE OFFICER & UNIT NCO TRAINING



### TRAINING TO IMPROVE:






CONFIDENTIAL

(7) Time Spent on Training by ARVN Infantry Battalions.

(a) Training Time. Time spent by ARVN organizations on training decreased as units devoted more time to combat operations. This category reflects total time devoted by battalions to training and provides for combining the time spent by smaller units into battalion-days. Time spent on major training programs, such as national and division level training, is also included. Chart 50 depicts a decrease in total time spent on training. There was, however, considerable variation in the time reported by each organization, with only one percent reported by the 7th Division and over 22 percent by the 23d Division.

(b) Refresher Training. Training programs for the maintenance of unit combat proficiency are conducted at training centers as unit refresher training (a four week course for infantry battalions), or as command-supervised in-place training. Each unit is required to complete refresher training once every three years. Chart 51 shows the percent of ARVN infantry battalions and special units which have either completed battalion refresher training since 1967, were in training on 31 December 1970, or were overdue refresher training on that date. The 1st and 2d Divisions were the only organizations having their battalion training completed for the three year period. An accelerated program to provide refresher training was planned for 1970, but increased combat activity caused cancellation of approximately half of this training. The use of training facilities for Cambodian forces had very little, if any, adverse effort on the program.

Chart 50




FIGURES INDICATE PERCENT OF TIME DEVOTED TO TRAINING

CONFIDENTIAL


Chart 51

ARVN/VNMC REFRESHER TRAINING

ARVN INFANTRY BATTAL LIONS



SPECIAL UNITS



CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 5. (C-NOFORN) Vietnamese Naval Forces Evaluation.

### a. Introduction.

(1) This report addresses the operational effectiveness of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). The report is based on the Naval Forces Evaluation System (NFES), a subsystem of SEER.

(2) In measuring the operational effectiveness of the VNN there are three major areas of interest:

(a) Improvement and Modernization

(b) Operational Performance

(c) Operational Results

(3) Although unquantifiable results frequently overshadow the quantifiable ones, a general feel for the situation can be obtained by examining the factors that make up these areas.

(4) A glossary of acronyms is included at the end of the section.

### b. Summary of Performance.

#### (1) Effectiveness.

(a) Craft turnovers are on schedule.

(b) Supply center performance is satisfactory.

(c) The VNN measure of effort (craft employment) was satisfactory during the quarter.

(d) The level of enemy initiated activity on the MR 3 and MR 4 waterways increased slightly over the previous quarter. Total personnel casualties increased by a third, and VNN craft lost or damaged were more than double those of the 3d Qtr CY 70. These casualties resulted primarily from mine and rocket attacks against the VNN units.

(e) The VNN assumed command of two operations (Breezy Cove and Search Turn), and four operations which were joint operations under VNN command became unilateral VNN operations, as the last of the small combatant craft were turned over to the VNN. Of fourteen operations currently active, two are combined operations under USN command; all others are unilateral VNN operations with, in most cases, USN advisors attached. The two combined operations, Solid Anchor and Market Time Outer Barrier, are scheduled to become unilateral VNN operations by mid-1971.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## (2) Problem Areas.

(a) Forces are short of officers and petty officers due to the rapid expansion of the VNN. Ninety percent of the officer strength is programmed to be attained by December 1971; this is an improvement over previous plans, which indicated attainment of the goal in May 1972. Ninety percent of the authorized petty officer strength is scheduled to be attained by June 1972, which indicates a slippage of about six months from previous plans. Percentage of authorized strength in the higher ranks is a severe problem which will persist for several years to come.

(b) Civilian repair facilities and shipyard strengths remain below a satisfactory level. Recent plans have set a slightly higher programmed level of civilian personnel; June 1972 is the target date set to attain 3,200 on-board work force. The reported count for the quarter is nearly 300 less than that reported for the previous quarter.

## c. Improvement and Modernization.

(1) Improvement and Modernization will be measured by examining:

- (a) Craft Inventories.
- (b) Personnel Strengths.
- (c) Training.
- (d) Logistics.

## (2) Craft Inventories.

(a) Actual and planned VNN combat and logistics lift craft are shown in Table 2. Craft assets are made available to the VNN through Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) deliveries and turnover of in-country USN assets. The craft turnover is on schedule.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

## ACTUAL AND PLANNED VNN CRAFT INVENTORIES

CATEGORY	ON HAND END CY 69:	ON HAND 31 DEC 70:	PLANNED 30 JUN 72:
Offshore Surveillance			
PC, PCE	7	9	9
PCF, WPB	41	133	133
DER, WHEC	0	0	4
	<u>48</u>	<u>142</u>	<u>146</u>
Inshore Surveillance			
JUNKS	246	246	246
MSC, PGM	23	23	23
HARBOR, MINE-DEFENSE CRAFT	0	103	109
	<u>269</u>	<u>372</u>	<u>378</u>
Riverine Craft			
RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT	109	224	224
PBR	90	293	293
PRE-ACTOV INVENTORY	274	274	274
	<u>473</u>	<u>791</u>	<u>791</u>
Logistics Craft			
HEAVY LIFT (LST, LSM, LCU, YOG, AKL)	21	28	34
LIGHT LIFT (LCM, BARGES, ETC)	56	71	197
TENDERS AND SUPPORT CRAFT	19	28	44
	<u>96</u>	<u>127</u>	<u>275</u>
TOTAL CRAFT	886	1432	1590

(b) Chart 52 shows the cumulative craft turnover to the VNN since 1 January 1969. This shows all craft, including small craft such as Boston whalers, picket boats and barges. During 4th Qtr CY 70, a total of 159 craft were delivered to the VNN, including the last of the riverine craft, and nearly the last of the offshore and inshore surveillance craft. Logistics craft delivery is also on schedule, with the last turnover scheduled for mid-1972, when the VNN assumes full responsibility for all logistics and maintenance support.


(3) Personnel Strength. Chart 53 shows the VNN personnel strength expansion from 1st Qtr CY 69. The personnel strength is 39,353, and is composed of 3,739 officers, 7,014 petty officers, and 28,600 enlisted men. The number of personnel in the pipeline (5,813) is a substantial reduction from last quarter's reported figure of 11,914, but is still about double the expected long-term program pipeline. The pipeline reduction is indicative of increasing personnel stabilization, as the VNN has attained its program strength, and further recruiting will be largely for officer candidate training and enlisted attrition.

(a) Ship, craft, and support activity personnel manning levels are displayed in Table 3 as percentages of allowances.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 52


USN CRAFT TURNED OVER TO VNN  
(CUMULATIVE SINCE JAN. 1969)



➤ TURNOVER GOAL

Chart 53

VNN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED



**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

## PERSONNEL MANNING LEVELS

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>AS OF 31 DEC 70</u>
Coastal Surveillance	
Officer	70%
Petty Officer	42%
Enlisted	123%
TOTAL	90%
River Security/Interdiction	
Officer	60%
Petty Officer	30%
Enlisted	150%
TOTAL	95%
River Assault/Interdiction	
Officer	63%
Petty Officer	29%
Enlisted	126%
TOTAL	86%
Logistic Lift	
Officer	84%
Petty Officer	47%
Enlisted	134%
TOTAL	96%
Pipeline, Training Facilities, & Support Activities	
Officer	57%
Petty Officer	94%
Enlisted	189%
TOTAL	126%
Civilian Repair	82%

(b) All categories are short of officers and petty officers. Continued training outposts have improved the manning levels for the combatant forces. The authorized strength of 39,611 requires 5,940 officers; at the end of the 4th Qtr CY 70, the on-board count was 63 percent of the requirement. Revised schedules indicate that ninety percent of the authorized officer strength will be on board by December 1971, and 100 percent by February 1973. Similarly, petty officer strength at the end of the quarter was 51 percent of the authorized 13,863. Ninety percent of authorized strength is scheduled for attainment in June 1972, and 100 percent in November 1972. These dates for attaining specified percentages of strength have been adjusted from previous program target dates, and are based on improved estimates of procurement and training capacities.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Civilian repair facilities and shipyard strengths remain below a satisfactory level. In the 4th Qtr CY 70, a revised total of 3,200 authorized personnel was established, with a target date of June 1972. Based on this figure, the authorized total as of 31 December 1970 was set at 2,400 personnel; the on-board count was 1,972, or 82 percent of authorized. Reported on-board strength during the previous quarter was 2,257 personnel. The shortage of skilled civilian personnel in the repair facilities has required augmentation with military personnel.

(4) Training. Training programs to support asset turnover and to upgrade the competence level of the VNN fell short of the goals set forth for CY 70. Fourth quarter performance was a considerable improvement in almost all areas of training over 3d Qtr CY 70. Cumulative inputs to the training programs, as percentages of the number of personnel programmed to start training, are shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

TRAINING

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE INPUT</u> <u>CALENDAR 1970</u> <u>31 DEC 70</u>
Recruit	63%
Basic Specialist	95%
Petty Officer	89%
Midshipman	92%
Warrant Officer	111%
English Language	92%
Boat School	46%
On-the-job Training, Crew	89%
On-the-job Training, Other than crew	74%
Off-shore (Outside Vietnam)	98%

(a) The VNN programmed input reflects the available student capacity of programmed classes, and is not necessarily an indication of critical requirements or a failure to provide adequate input. For example, the 37 percent cumulative shortfall in recruit training for CY 70 appears to indicate recruiting problems, whereas the attainment of authorized strength in June led to incomplete filling of available spaces in recruit classes.




# CONFIDENTIAL

(b) During the 4th Qtr CY 70, the input to several categories of schooling was in excess of 100 percent of programmed numbers. In general, this was due to late convening of classes which were scheduled to convene in previous months. QJT (Crew) was very high, with a reported input of 1795% of programmed input; this type of training is not severely limited by capacity requirements. Other courses, however, can run well above the programmed input, as the VNN will admit larger classes than programmed capacity if the personnel are available.

(c) The lack of qualified enrollees in the English Language school caused shortfall in the actual number of inputs. A similar shortfall in off-shore training was caused by the non-availability of LDNN (VNN SEAL) officer trainees.

(d) Chart 54 shows the total VNN training inputs and outputs for each quarter in 1969 and 1970, as well as the number of personnel in training at the end of each quarter.

Chart 54



## (5) Logistics.

(a) Logistics performance will be measured by examining:

- 1 Supply Center Performance.
- 2 Transportation Performance .
- 3 Craft Availability.

# CONFIDENTIAL


# CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Supply Center Performance. VNN Supply Center performance data, and standards established for the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Management System (RIMMS), are listed in Table 5. Rejection rate is the percentage of requisitions submitted which were incomplete or improperly submitted, and were therefore rejected. Demand accommodation is the percent of valid requisitions which are for items on the Supply Center load lists, whether or not the items ordered were in stock. Stockage satisfaction measures the percent of those items which are in stock, if the requisitioned item is on the load list. Customer satisfaction measures the percent of valid requisitions which are filled from the load list of the Supply Center. Taken together, the indicators reveal that the Supply Center has a valid load list and is able to meet customer demands. Review of the Supply Center performance during the entire year shows that during the first quarter, the average requisition load was under 8,800 requisitions per month, and by the fourth quarter this load had risen to over 14,000 requisitions per month. For the month of December, the requisition load was 17,325; and for that month, all the effectiveness indicators were about as shown for the quarter. Thus, as the load on the Supply Center approximately doubled during the year, indicated performance continued to meet the required standards.

TABLE 5  
SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS

INDICATOR	DESIRED	SATISFACTORY	30 SEP 70
Requisition Rejection Rate	10%	15%	10%
Demand Accommodation	90%	75%	85%
Stockage Satisfaction	85%	75%	77%
Customer Satisfaction	70%	60%	65%

Chart 55



# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Transportation Performance. The number of tons of cargo and POL lifted by the logistic flotilla, and the RIMMS standard, are shown on Chart 55. The desired standard is based on average capacities and a 70 percent utilization of craft. During the 4th Qtr CY 70, craft availability and employment continued to meet at least the satisfactory levels established by RIMMS. Logistic lift increased over that reported for the 3d quarter, and indicates a long-term increasing trend since 2d Qtr CY 69, interrupted only by the exceptional performance during the Cambodian operations in early 1970. The continued shortfall below the desired level of logistic lift is indicative of the inefficiency of scheduling and cargo handling imposed by JGS control of the major logistic craft, with the previously reported problems of short notice, short loading, and no backloading of cargo.

(d) Craft Availability. Availability is a gross measure of VNN ability in craft maintenance and supply of spare parts. The USN and VNN presently have a single logistic tail, and USN facilities are responsible for the support of VNN craft until the turnover of all repair facilities is complete in FY 72. The indicator is, therefore, currently a measure of the combined effort to maintain PCFs, PBRs and RAC. Since the VNN facilities maintain the older craft, the availability of such craft (e.g., logistics lift vessels) is a truer measure of strictly VNN capability, when consideration is given to the fact that some of these craft are 15 years old.

1 If a craft is capable of getting underway, it is considered available. The indicator does not measure the operability of armament, communications equipment, or auxiliary engineering equipment.

2 The availability of selected craft is indicated on Chart 56.

a PCF/WPB availability dropped to the same level as reported during the first quarter of CY 70. The inventory of PCF/WPBs is now approximately three times that at the start of the year, and the entire Market Time Inner Barrier operations are supported from the VNN inventory.

b PBR availability dropped to 83 percent, 7 percent below the desired standard. While this still exceeds the "satisfactory" standard of 80 percent, a continuing downtrend in the availability of PBRs has continued for the entire year, and may be cause for concern if not reversed. Forty-one PBRs were added to the inventory during this quarter, and the total inventory in this category has tripled during the year.

c River assault craft (RAID, RAG, and RID) remain below the desired standard of 80%, but the 77% availability sustained over the 3d and 4th quarters, in face of substantial operations in the Delta and U Minh Forest, are indicative of good performance in craft maintenance.


d Availability of logistic lift craft declined for the third quarter in a row, but still remain one percent above the desired availability standard of 70%.

CONFIDENTIAL


Chart 56

CRAFT AVAILABILITY


PCF/WPB & PBR



RIVER ASSAULT



LOGISTICS LIFT



--- DESIRED AVAILABILITY

# CONFIDENTIAL

## d. Operational Performance.

(1) Operational performance will be measured by examining:

- (a) Craft Employment.
- (b) Performance Indicators.

(2) Craft Employment. Employment is a measure of the VNN level of activity. A craft is employed if it gets underway. A fleet command ship, however, is considered employed the entire time it is deployed from Saigon, even if it is in port. The indicator does not reveal whether the unit was gainfully employed. The indicator must be used in conjunction with advisors' reports and the performance indicators. Charts 57 and 58 show quarterly craft employment statistics for 1969 and 1970.

(a) The standards for employment were based, for older craft, upon past VNN performance, and for newer assets (PCF and WPB), on past USN performance.

(b) Coastal surveillance craft employment continued to stand above the satisfactory level, and slightly below the desired level of employment. The employment of PCF and WPB, the major craft assigned to this mission, continued above the desired standard of 50 percent employment.

(c) River security craft employment continued to be above the desired standard, participating in the various operations in the rivers and canals of Military Regions 1, 3, and 4.

(d) River Assault Craft (RAG, RAID, RID) employment dropped slightly from that reported for the previous quarter, but still stood well above the standard for satisfactory employment.

(e) Logistic lift craft employment, about 60%, was midway between satisfactory (55%) and desired (65%) standards. More efficient scheduling could improve this performance, as craft availability, reported above, was 71%.


(3) Performance Indicators. The four indicators listed in Table 6 were developed to give an indication of the performance of three major VNN operating groups. These indicators have been normalized (averaged over all craft in a specific group), and have meaning only when compared to a standard. The standard values are based on the performance of USN units operating in the specified areas prior to 1970. The VNN performance indicators for 4th Qtr CY 70 are as listed in Table 6, and were derived from VNN operational summaries and advisors' spot reports. For this period, the indicators show a fairly light level of activity, except for the RAIDs during the month of December. The large figure for friendly

# CONFIDENTIAL


Chart 57

## VIETNAMESE NAVAL CRAFT EMPLOYMENT

### COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CRAFT



### RIVER SECURITY CRAFT



----- ASSIGNED      ■ EMPLOYED      > DESIRED EMPLOYMENT  
< SATISFACTORY EMPLOYMENT


# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL


Chart 58

## VIETNAMESE NAVAL CRAFT EMPLOYMENT

### RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT



### LOGISTICS LIFT CRAFT



----- ASSIGNED

■ EMPLOYED

➤ DESIRED EMPLOYMENT

◀ SATISFACTORY EMPLOYMENT

100

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

casualties per unit, and low figures for enemy eliminated and boats damaged/destroyed per unit reflect an increased enemy emphasis on ambush tactics in the 3d and 4th Riverine Areas. In general, an evaluation of VNN unit performance should take into account the performance indicators shown; these should be subjected to value judgment based on the employment of forces, the enemy strategy, the level of operations, environmental factors and any other pertinent information available. From these considerations, a relative picture of VNN performance and readiness can be obtained. In operations such as Giant Slingshot, where VNN river patrol groups were integrated with USN river divisions, it was difficult to detect any differences in readiness and training of the two navies.

TABLE 6  
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>STANDARD</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>
<u>Coastal Divisions</u>				
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.03	.01	.01	.01
Incidents per Unit	.54	.02	.02	.01
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.10	.06	.00	.01
Enemy Eliminated per Unit	.26	.00	.00	.00
<u>River Patrol Divisions</u>				
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.37	.10	.01	.01
Incidents per Unit	.85	.07	.07	.12
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.15	.05	.04	.02
Enemy Eliminated per Unit	.52	.01	.05	.06
<u>River Assault &amp; Interdiction Divisions</u>				
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.27	.04	.03	.04
Incidents per Unit	.17	.09	.07	.12
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.27	.16	.12	.41
Enemy Eliminated per Unit	.22	.00	.03	.05

(a) Coastal Flotillas. The VNN has five coastal flotillas composed of WPBs and PCFs. Four of these flotillas are assigned to Market Time Inner Barrier stations, and the fifth flotilla, equipped solely with PCFs, is assigned to operations in the Mekong Delta. The VNN operates the entire Market Time Inner Barrier; all outer barrier stations are manned by USN vessels. The turnover of the Inner Barrier was completed in September 1970; with the turnover of the Outer Barrier scheduled for June 1971, this part of the ACTOV program will be completed.

# CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

(b) River Patrol Divisions. During 4th Qtr CY 70, 41 PBRs were turned over to the VNN. The number of River Patrol Divisions (RPD) rose from 12 to 14; each of these RPDs is assigned 20 PBRs, with the exception of RPD 65. The RPDs are tasked with maintaining the security of the waterways, primarily in MR 3 and 4. PPD 65, with ten craft assigned, operates out of Binh Thuy with two missions, training of boat crews and escort group operations in the Delta waterways.


(c) Other River Forces. In addition to the RPDs, the VNN operates River Assault Interdiction Divisions (RAIDs) and River Interdiction Divisions (RIDs). Both types of units are composed of approximately 15 boats per division, made up of ASPBs, CCBs, ATCs and monitors. The craft mix may vary with the assigned mission, location and type of craft available. There are also 13 River Assault Groups (RAGs) equipped with craft available to the VNN prior to the ACTOV program, largely old French and US equipment, including LCVPs. The addition of 39 River Assault Craft during 4th Qtr CY 70 allowed the formation of three more RIDs, to make a total of nine. The nine RIDs were employed in operations Giant Slingshot, Solid Anchor, Breezy Cove, Tran Hung Dao I and Tran Hung Dao VIII. The six RAIDs were employed in Search Turn, Solid Anchor and the Mekong Delta, including operations in Cambodia, where three RAIDs were employed during much of the quarter. The RAGs were employed in MR 3 and 4, assigned to general security, convoy escort and interdiction.

e. Areas of Operational Responsibility. Chart 59 shows the location of the various riverine operations in MR 3 and MR 4. The combined operations join USN and VNN personnel in the same fighting effort, with the VNN eventually assuming total control of these operations.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 59



103

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

(1) During the 4th Qtr CY 70, VNN assumed command of operations Breezy Cove and Search Turn, which were combined operations under USN command prior to this period.

(2) During this quarter, combined operations already under VNN control became unilateral operations, with only USN advisors; these operations included Giant Slingshot, Barrier Reef, Tran Hung Dao I and the Rung Sat Special Zone.

(3) During this quarter, one major operation in the U Minh Forest area was commenced. This operation includes ARVN and VNN elements; the VNN operation, Tran Hung Dao XVII, commenced on 1 Dec 70 and is shown on chart 59.

(4) Two small operations which have been continuing with VNN units, as unilateral VNN operations, have been included on the chart for the first time. These operations, Tran Hung Dao VIII and Tran Hung Dao XIV, are in the area formerly covered by USN operation Blue Shark, but were independent VNN operations from their inception.

(5) Not shown in the chart are the operations in MR 1, known as Chi Lang I (a unilateral VNN operation), and the Market Time operations. Market Time Inner Barrier, now designated Tran Hung Dao XV, is a unilateral VNN operation; Market Time Outer Barrier, a combined operation with USN commander, is scheduled to become a unilateral VNN operation in early 1971.

f. Operational Results. Operational results attained by the VNN during 1969 and 1970 are shown on chart 60. While an unfavorable ratio is indicated in the comparison of craft captured, destroyed and damaged, this is misleading, as it shows only those enemy craft which were destroyed or damaged by the VNN. The USN air support for VNN destroyed or damaged another 348 craft, changing the ratio to a more acceptable 5.1:1. There was a similar large contribution to the "enemy eliminated" due to air support, as USN and US Army aircraft killed or captured an additional 342 enemy while supporting Vietnamese naval operations. The total VNN personnel casualties increased 44 percent over the previous quarter, and the total vessels destroyed or damaged more than doubled, indicating an increased exposure and targeting of the VNN in riverine operations.


# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL


Chart 60

## VIETNAMESE NAVY RESULTS


### ENEMY-VNN CRAFT CAPTURED, DESTROYED, AND DAMAGED



### ENEMY ELIM-VNN KIA



### COASTAL CRAFT SEARCHED



# CONFIDENTIAL

## GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACTOVLOG	Accelerated Turnover Logistics Program
AKL	Attack Cargo, Light
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
CCB	Command and Control Boat
CZ	Coastal Zone
DER	Destroyer Escort, Radar
JGS	Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
LCM1	Landing Craft, Mechanized, Minesweeper
LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCM-8	Landing Craft, Mechanized Mark 8 (large LCM)
LCU	Landing Craft, Utility
LSIL	Landing Ship, Infantry, Large
LSSL	Landing Ship, Support, Large
LSM	Landing Ship, Medium
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MI MS	Motor Launch Mine Sweeper
MR	Military Region
MSC	Coastal Minesweeper
OJT	On the Job Training
PBR	Patrol Boat River
PC	Patrol Craft
PCE	Patrol Craft, Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft, Fast
PGM	Patrol Motor Gunship
RAC	River Assault Craft
RAG	River Assault Group
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division
RID	River Interdiction Division
RPD	River Patrol Division
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
TF	Task Force
TG	Task Group
WHEC	Coast Guard Cutter, High Endurance
WPB	Coast Guard Patrol Boat
YOG	Coastal Oiler
YTL	Small Yard Tug

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX A

Enemy Contacts

Results per battalion in terms of number and hours of contact are shown in this annex for each major organization. Results are shown for total contacts, platoon-, company- and battalion-size contacts, and contacts by day and night.

A-1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTACTS

ALL MISSIONS  
ALL OPERATIONS

	ALL CONTACTS										PLATOON CONTACTS										AVER	
	NO.	BN	STBN	HRS	AV	STBN	AV	NO.	BN	STBN	HRS	AV	STBN	AV	NO.	BN	STBN	HRS	AV	STBN	AV	UP
01 DIV	30	5.3	6.8	81	4.8	6.1	0.90	79	4.8	6.0	6.8	4.0	5.2	0.86								
02 DIV	336	28.0	41.0	211	17.6	25.8	0.63	295	24.6	36.0	193	16.1	23.6	0.65								
03 DIV	128	32.0	35.6	45	11.3	12.5	0.35	127	31.8	35.3	44	11.0	12.2	0.35								
04 DIV	554	16.8	22.2	327	10.2	13.5	0.61	501	15.2	20.0	305	5.2	12.2	0.61								
05 DIV	198	16.5	22.6	122	10.2	14.1	0.62	181	15.1	20.9	111	9.2	12.8	0.61								
06 DIV	165	13.7	19.6	83	6.9	9.9	0.50	149	12.4	17.7	65	5.4	7.7	0.44								
07 DIV	24	8.5	15.7	31	7.3	14.3	0.91	34	8.5	15.7	31	7.8	14.3	0.91								
08 DIV	397	14.2	20.6	236	8.4	12.3	0.59	364	13.0	18.9	207	7.4	10.7	0.57								
09 DIV	58	8.2	10.3	53	7.7	5.8	0.95	90	7.5	9.5	85	7.1	9.0	0.94								
10 DIV	67	5.6	6.8	64	5.3	6.5	0.96	33	2.7	3.3	23	1.9	2.3	0.70								
11 DIV	135	11.6	14.7	143	11.9	15.1	1.03	127	10.6	13.4	121	10.1	12.8	0.95								
12 DIV	304	8.4	10.5	300	8.3	10.4	0.99	250	6.9	8.7	229	6.4	7.9	0.92								
13 DIV	255	21.6	30.2	180	15.0	21.0	0.69	248	20.7	29.0	166	13.1	19.3	0.67								
14 DIV	374	31.2	45.2	507	42.2	61.3	1.36	339	28.2	41.0	448	37.3	54.1	1.32								
15 DIV	212	17.7	36.4	354	42.8	67.6	1.86	133	11.1	22.8	130	10.8	22.3	0.98								
16 DIV	845	23.5	37.2	1081	30.0	47.7	1.28	721	20.0	31.8	744	20.7	32.8	1.03								
17 DIV	2100	15.8	21.5	1554	14.7	20.4	0.93	1836	13.8	19.2	1485	11.2	15.5	0.81								
18 DIV	34	6.0	8.2	22	5.5	5.7	0.69	30	7.5	7.7	17	4.3	4.4	0.57								
19 DIV	50	16.7	17.3	22	7.3	7.6	0.44	46	15.3	15.9	18	6.0	6.2	0.39								
20 DIV	45	9.0	8.3	53	18.6	17.1	2.07	18	3.6	3.3	23	4.6	4.2	1.28								
21 DIV	41	8.2	7.3	43	8.6	7.7	1.05	36	7.2	6.4	38	7.6	6.8	1.06								
22 DIV	168	5.5	5.4	180	10.6	10.1	1.07	130	7.6	7.3	96	5.6	5.4	0.74								
23 DIV	62	20.7	23.6	27	9.0	10.3	0.44	61	20.3	23.2	25	8.3	9.5	0.41								
24 DIV	21	7.0	9.9	08	2.7	3.8	0.38	21	7.0	9.9	08	2.7	3.8	0.38								
25 DIV	56	10.7	14.4	78	8.7	11.7	0.81	59	6.6	8.8	46	5.1	6.0	0.78								
26 DIV	86	17.2	26.1	90	18.0	27.3	1.05	53	10.6	16.1	44	8.8	13.4	0.83								
27 DIV	265	13.3	18.0	203	10.2	13.8	0.77	194	9.7	13.2	123	6.2	8.4	0.63								
28 DIV	55	6.1	7.2	40	4.4	5.3	0.73	48	5.3	6.3	29	3.2	3.8	0.60								
29 DIV	46	5.1	4.6	81	9.0	8.0	1.76	42	4.7	4.2	56	6.2	5.6	1.33								
30 DIV	534	9.7	10.6	504	9.2	10.0	0.94	414	7.5	8.2	304	5.5	6.1	0.73								
31 DIV	2634	14.0	18.0	2458	13.1	16.8	0.93	2250	11.9	15.4	1789	9.5	12.3	0.80								

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL MISSIONS ALL OPERATIONS		COMPANY CONTACTS										BATTALION CONTACTS													
		BN		STBN		HPS		BN		STBN		HPS		BN		STBN		HPS		BN		STBN		HPS	
		NO.	AV	AV	OUR	NO.	AV	AV	OUR	NO.	AV	AV	OUR	NO.	AV	AV	OUR	NO.	AV	AV	OUR	NO.	AV	AV	OUR
01 CIV	10	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.20	12	0.7	0.9	1.20	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.00
02 CIV	40	3.3	4.5	17	2.1	17	1.4	2.1	0.43	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.00
51 REG	01	0.3	0.3	01	0.3	01	0.3	0.3	1.00	00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00
I MF	51	1.5	2.0	30	0.5	30	0.5	1.2	0.59	02	0.1	0.1	0.1	02	0.1	0.1	0.1	02	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.00
22 CIV	17	1.4	2.0	11	0.5	11	0.5	1.3	0.65	00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00
23 CIV	15	1.2	1.6	17	1.4	17	1.4	2.0	1.13	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.00
42 REG	00	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00
11 MR	32	1.1	1.7	28	1.0	28	1.0	1.5	0.86	01	0.0	0.0	0.0	01	0.0	0.0	0.0	01	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.00
05 CIV	06	0.5	0.6	06	0.5	06	0.5	0.6	1.00	02	0.2	0.2	0.2	02	0.2	0.2	0.2	02	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.00
18 CIV	17	1.4	1.7	18	1.5	18	1.5	1.8	1.06	17	1.4	1.7	1.7	23	1.9	2.3	1.35	23	1.9	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	1.35
25 CIV	11	0.9	1.2	15	1.6	15	1.6	2.0	1.73	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	03	0.2	0.3	3.00	03	0.2	0.3	3.00	0.3	0.3	3.00	
111 MR	34	0.9	1.2	43	1.2	43	1.2	1.5	1.26	20	0.6	0.7	29	0.8	1.0	1.40	29	0.8	1.0	1.40	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.40	
07 CIV	05	0.4	0.6	07	0.6	07	0.6	0.8	1.40	05	0.4	0.6	0.7	07	0.6	0.8	1.40	07	0.6	0.8	1.40	0.8	0.8	1.40	
09 CIV	34	2.8	4.1	58	4.8	58	4.8	7.0	1.71	01	0.1	0.1	0.1	01	0.1	0.1	1.00	01	0.1	0.1	1.00	0.1	0.1	1.00	
21 CIV	19	1.6	3.3	45	4.1	45	4.1	8.4	2.58	60	5.0	10.3	215	17.9	36.9	3.58	215	17.9	36.9	3.58	36.9	36.9	36.9	3.58	
IV MF	58	1.6	2.6	114	3.2	114	3.2	5.0	1.97	66	1.8	2.9	223	6.2	9.8	3.38	223	6.2	9.8	3.38	9.8	9.8	9.8	3.38	
CV INF TOTALS	175	1.3	1.8	215	1.6	215	1.6	2.2	1.23	89	0.7	0.9	254	1.9	2.7	2.85	254	1.9	2.7	2.85	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.85	
CV 1 MR	02	0.5	0.5	05	1.3	05	1.3	1.3	2.50	00	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
CV 2 MR	02	0.7	0.7	03	1.0	03	1.0	1.0	1.50	02	0.7	0.7	01	0.3	0.3	0.50	01	0.3	0.3	0.50	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.50	
CV 3 MR	21	4.2	3.9	41	8.2	41	8.2	7.5	1.95	06	1.2	1.1	29	5.8	5.3	4.83	29	5.8	5.3	4.83	5.3	5.3	5.3	4.83	
CV 4 MR	04	0.8	0.7	04	0.8	04	0.8	0.7	1.00	01	0.2	0.2	01	0.2	0.2	1.00	01	0.2	0.2	1.00	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.00	
CV TOTALS	29	1.7	1.6	53	3.1	53	3.1	3.0	1.83	09	0.5	0.5	31	1.8	1.7	3.44	31	1.8	1.7	3.44	1.7	1.7	1.7	3.44	
FA 1 MF	01	0.3	0.4	02	0.7	02	0.7	0.8	2.00	00	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
FA 2 MF	00	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	00	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
FA 3 MR	35	3.9	5.2	26	2.9	26	2.9	3.9	0.74	02	0.2	0.3	06	0.7	0.9	3.00	06	0.7	0.9	3.00	0.9	0.9	0.9	3.00	
FA 4 MR	15	3.0	4.6	23	4.6	23	4.6	7.0	1.53	18	3.6	5.5	23	4.6	7.0	1.28	23	4.6	7.0	1.28	7.0	7.0	7.0	1.28	
FA TOTALS	51	2.6	3.5	51	2.6	51	2.6	3.5	1.00	20	1.0	1.4	29	1.5	2.0	1.45	29	1.5	2.0	1.45	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.45	
AB CIV	07	0.8	0.9	11	1.2	11	1.2	1.4	1.57	00	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
VNMC	03	0.3	0.3	16	1.6	16	1.6	1.6	5.33	01	0.1	0.1	09	1.0	0.9	9.00	09	1.0	0.9	9.00	0.9	0.9	0.9	9.00	
SPEC UNITS	90	1.6	1.8	131	2.4	131	2.4	2.6	1.46	30	0.5	0.6	69	1.3	1.4	2.30	69	1.3	1.4	2.30	1.4	1.4	1.4	2.30	
AFVN/VNMC	265	1.4	1.8	346	1.8	346	1.8	2.4	1.31	119	0.6	0.8	323	1.7	2.2	2.71	323	1.7	2.2	2.71	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.71	

CONFIDENTIAL



ALL MISSIONS  
ALL OPERATIONS

CONTACTS

	ALL DAY CONTACTS				NIGHT CONTACTS				STAY			
	NO.	BN	STBN	HRS	AV	BN	STBN	HRS	AV	BN	STBN	AV
01 CIV	71	4.4	5.4	67	3.5	5.1	5.1	1.4	1.1	0.8	1.1	0.74
02 CIV	178	14.8	21.7	116	9.8	14.4	13.2	19.3	7.7	7.7	11.4	0.59
51 REG	95	23.8	26.4	32	8.0	8.9	8.3	9.2	13	3.3	3.6	0.35
1 MR	344	10.4	13.8	217	6.6	8.7	6.4	8.4	120	3.6	4.9	0.57
22 CIV	115	9.6	13.3	83	6.5	5.6	6.9	9.6	3.9	3.2	4.5	0.47
23 CIV	130	11.6	16.5	61	5.1	7.2	2.2	3.1	22	1.8	2.6	0.85
42 REG	25	6.3	11.6	22	5.5	10.2	2.3	4.2	0.9	2.3	4.2	1.00
11 MR	275	10.0	14.5	160	5.5	8.6	4.2	6.1	70	2.5	3.6	0.59
05 CIV	83	6.9	8.8	78	6.5	8.2	1.2	1.6	15	1.2	1.6	1.00
18 CIV	55	4.6	5.6	52	4.3	5.3	1.0	1.2	12	1.0	1.2	1.00
25 CIV	114	9.5	12.0	118	9.8	12.4	2.1	2.6	25	2.1	2.6	1.00
111 MR	252	7.0	8.7	248	6.5	8.6	1.4	1.8	52	1.4	1.8	1.00
07 CIV	158	13.2	18.4	110	5.4	12.8	8.4	11.8	70	5.8	8.2	0.65
09 CIV	235	19.6	28.4	356	29.7	43.0	11.6	16.8	151	12.6	18.2	1.09
21 CIV	166	13.8	28.5	340	28.3	58.3	3.9	7.9	54	4.5	9.3	1.17
IV MR	559	15.5	24.6	806	22.4	35.5	7.9	12.6	275	7.6	12.1	0.96
INF TOTALS	1434	10.8	15.0	1437	10.8	15.0	5.0	7.0	517	3.9	5.4	0.78
CV 1 MR	22	5.5	5.7	15	3.8	3.9	2.5	2.6	07	1.8	1.8	0.70
CV 2 MR	44	14.7	15.2	16	5.3	5.5	2.0	2.1	06	2.0	2.1	1.00
CV 3 MR	42	8.4	7.7	67	17.4	16.0	0.6	0.6	06	1.2	1.1	2.00
CV 4 MR	34	6.8	6.1	37	7.4	6.6	1.4	1.2	06	1.2	1.1	0.86
CV TOTALS	142	8.4	8.0	155	9.1	8.7	1.5	1.5	25	1.5	1.4	0.96
AN 1 MR	43	14.3	16.4	20	6.1	7.6	6.3	7.2	07	2.3	2.7	0.37
AN 2 MR	21	7.0	9.9	08	2.7	3.6	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00
AN 3 MR	61	6.8	9.1	53	5.5	7.5	3.9	5.2	25	2.8	3.7	0.71
AN 4 MR	37	7.4	11.2	36	7.2	10.9	9.8	14.8	54	10.8	16.4	1.10
AN TOTALS	162	8.1	11.0	117	5.9	7.9	5.2	7.0	86	4.3	5.8	0.83
AB CIV	43	4.8	5.7	33	3.7	4.3	1.3	1.6	07	0.8	0.9	0.58
VNMC	43	4.8	4.3	76	8.4	7.5	0.3	0.3	05	0.6	0.5	1.67
SPEC UNITS	390	7.1	7.6	381	6.5	7.6	2.6	2.9	123	2.2	2.4	0.85
AFVN/VNMC	1824	9.7	12.5	1818	9.7	12.5	4.3	5.5	640	3.4	4.4	0.79

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX B

Enemy Initiated Incidents and Results

Shown in this annex by division and separate regiment are the numbers of enemy initiated incidents by type, whether day or night, and the resulting number of friendly KIA, WIA, MIA or captured; enemy eliminated; and weapons captured or lost.

B-1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS										
	INCID DL N		EN KIA DL N		FR KIA DL N		FRIENDLY WIA/MIA/CAPT		WEAPONS LOST CAPT	
1ST DIV										
ASSAULT	6	1	0	0	2	0	8	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	27	1	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	52	1	0	0	26	3	104	0	0	0
2ND DIV										
ASSAULT	0	2	0	24	1	1	7	0	0	4
AMBUSH	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	3	2	0	0	4	2	5	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	5	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	58	9	1	4	33	9	130	0	0	0
51ST REGT										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	53	0	0	0	7	0	62	0	0	0

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS										
	INCID DL N		EN KIA DL N		FR KIA DL N		FRIENDLY WIA/MIA/CAPT		WEAPONS LOST CAPT	
22ND DIV										
ASSAULT	2	0	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
AMBUSH	1	2	2	2	0	2	1	0	0	2
ATTACK BY FIRE	3	3	0	3	3	3	50	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	26	2	0	0	14	1	54	0	0	0
23RD DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	6	1	0	0	4	3	4	0	0	0
42ND REG										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	2	0	0	0	13	0	4	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	3	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS										
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT		LOST	CAPT
5TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	2	0	10	0	0	3	0	0	0
AMBUSH	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	3	3	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	30	2	7	0	13	0	95	0	1	2
18TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	3	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	2	1	0	0	0	1	7	0	0	0
25TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	23	0	0	0	12	2	33	0	0	0

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS										
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT		LOST	CAPT
7TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	8	10	1	21	2	9	37	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	250	22	0	0	30	19	407	0	0	0
9TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	2	0	0	0	10	10	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	61	3	0	0	17	5	122	0	0	0
21ST DIV										
ASSAULT	1	7	6	43	0	3	50	2	0	47
AMBUSH	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
ATTACK BY FIRE	3	11	0	8	1	23	32	0	0	2
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	76	7	0	0	46	0	243	0	0	0

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID DL N		EN KIA DL N		FR KIA DL N		FRIENDLY WIA/MIA/CAPT		WEAPONS LOST CAPT	
AIRBORNE										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	5	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0
CAVALRY										
ASSAULT	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
AMBUSH	7	2	19	0	0	1	19	0	0	7
ATTACK BY FIRE	18	5	0	0	0	1	16	0	0	1
TERR/SABO/HARS	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	66	1	0	0	32	10	113	0	6	0
RANGERS										
ASSAULT	3	0	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	0
AMBUSH	6	1	0	5	3	0	11	1	1	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	3	10	2	6	2	3	27	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	128	11	0	0	31	6	300	0	0	0

	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID DL N		EN KIA DL N		FR KIA DL N		FRIENDLY WIA/MIA/CAPT		WEAPONS LOST CAPT	
MARINES										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	11	0	0	0	9	0	11	0	1	0
ASSAULT										
AMBUSH										
ATTACK BY FIRE										
TERR/SABO/HARS										
MINE/BOOBY TRAP										
ASSAULT										
AMBUSH										
ATTACK BY FIRE										
TERR/SABO/HARS										
MINE/BOOBY TRAP										

B-4

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## ANNEX C

### Effort, Results and Caches Discovered

1. Distribution of effort as shown in this annex is the percent of time spent on the different types of operations by divisions and separate battalions. Distribution of effort is based on the actual number of battalion days spent on each type of operation, against the number of battalion days available. The following definitions apply to the operations used in this annex:

a. Combat Operations. Offensive actions where the primary mission is to locate and neutralize VC/NVA main force units, their equipment, base areas, and lines of communication.

b. Operations in Support of Pacification. Operations conducted in or adjacent to areas in which pacification is in progress.

(1) Pacification Active. Offensive operations which have the purpose of protecting pacification areas by neutralizing enemy district, provincial, local, and/or guerrilla forces and enemy infrastructures. This can include reconnaissance in force, direct attacks against located enemy forces, cordon and search operations, long range patrols, and ambushes.

(2) Pacification Static. Defensive operations which have the purpose of denying enemy access to pacification areas. This includes outpost, patrols, and strong points within the immediate vicinity of the protected area, and security and reserve missions which are in support of pacification.

c. Rehabilitation. Time spent restoring a unit's physical and mental strength with rest and resupply.

d. Reserve. Maneuver units, including alerted but not committed reaction force, are in reserve when so designated by the appropriate commander and not otherwise employed.

e. Security Operations (Other than support of Pacification). Operations conducted to protect the population, military, and political and economic resources and installations.

f. Training. Those missions in which forces are involved in training.

2. Pages C-2 to C-18 contain tabulations for distribution of effort (combat, security, pacification active, pacification static, reserve, training and rehabilitation), friendly KIA and enemy eliminated, captured or surrendered, weapons captured versus lost, and caches, as reported by all ARVN/VNMC organizations. Page C-18 contains tabulation for distribution of effort for the 3d Qtr CY 70 and the 4th Qtr CY 70 by major ARVN/VNMC organization.

C-1

# CONFIDENTIAL

1 CORPS 01 INFANTRY DIVISION

EFFORT

RESULTS

UNITS	PCT TIME CST OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ESTIM	FRIENDLY CIA	CAS RATIO	EVENY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS			CACHES		
									CPTD	LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	LBS	AMMO

INF REGT RATINGS

01 REGT	70.38	19.29	.00	.00	143	5	28.6/1	1	0	41	0	9	3	12
02 REGT	70.00	19.35	.00	.00	35	17	2.1/1	0	0	16	0	0	10	13
03 REGT	98.91	.54	.00	.00	121	14	8.6/1	1	0	59	0	0	17	14
54 REGT	8 40	9.78	.00	.00	43	8	5.4/1	4	0	24	0	0	2	1

INF BN RATINGS

001 BN 01 REGT	73.91	26.09	.00	.00	15	1	15.0/1	0	0	6	0	0	1	5
002 BN 01 REGT	79.35	10.97	.00	.00	39	1	39.0/1	0	0	9	0	9	0	4
003 BN 01 REGT	80.43	19.57	.00	.00	27	0		0	0	9	0	0	0	3
004 BN 01 REGT	47.83	20.65	.00	.00	61	3	20.3/1	1	0	17	0	0	2	2
001 BN 02 REGT	53.26	14.13	.00	.00	1	2	0.5/1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
002 BN 02 REGT	84.78	15.22	.00	.00	4	6	0.7/1	0	0	2	0	0	0	3
003 BN 02 REGT	59.78	19.57	.00	.00	0	5		0	0	0	0	0	0	3
004 BN 02 REGT	72.83	27.17	.00	.00	23	4	5.8/1	0	0	11	0	0	0	3
005 BN 02 REGT	79.35	20.65	.00	.00	7	0		0	0	3	0	0	13	13
001 BN 03 REGT	97.83	2.17	.00	.00	65	1	63.0/1	1	0	23	0	0	15	13
002 BN 03 REGT	97.83	.00	.00	.00	37	5	7.4/1	0	0	16	0	0	2	1
003 BN 03 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	7	2	3.5/1	0	0	14	0	0	0	3
004 BN 03 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	14	6	2.3/1	0	0	6	0	0	0	3
001 BN 54 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	13	4	3.3/1	3	0	6	0	0	0	3
002 BN 54 REGT	96.74	.00	.00	.00	15	1	16.0/1	0	0	10	0	0	1	1
003 BN 54 REGT	73.91	26.09	.00	.00	11	3		1	0	6	0	0	0	3
004 BN 54 REGT	86.96	13.04	.00	.00	3	0	3.7/1	0	0	2	0	0	1	3
AVERAGE	81.45	12.65	.00	.00	20.1	2.5	8.0/1	.3	.0	8.2	.0	.5	1.8	2.1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1 CORPS 02 INFANTRY DIVISION

EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES					
UNITS	PCT TIME C&T OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY CIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	LBS AMMO	
INF REGT RATINGS													
04 REGT	52.17	24.18	23.37	.27	231	13	17.8/1	53	13	62	0	3	94
05 REGT	65.76	10.33	3.25	13.05	324	28	11.2/1	52	46	68	0	15	15
06 REGT	29.62	2.99	19.29	40.76	539	27	20.0/1	79	5	94	0	21	20
INF BN RATINGS													
001 BN 04 REGT	50.00	29.35	20.65	.00	140	2	20.0/1	7	0	14	0	3	1
002 BN 04 REGT	59.78	18.48	20.55	1.39	76	6	12.7/1	21	0	16	0	0	4
003 BN 04 REGT	52.17	30.43	17.39	.00	166	4	11.5/1	6	6	10	0	0	7
004 BN 04 REGT	46.74	18.48	34.78	.00	69	1	69.0/1	19	7	22	0	0	82
001 BN 05 REGT	36.96	17.0	1.09	2.17	15	0		2	2	2	0	0	5
002 BN 05 REGT	79.35	5.43	4.35	10.87	109	8	13.6/1	20	30	24	0	0	2
003 BN 05 REGT	67.37	8.70	7.61	15.30	93	4	23.3/1	11	4	24	0	8	0
004 BN 05 REGT	79.35	9.78	.00	13.87	97	16	6.1/1	19	10	18	0	7	10
001 BN 06 REGT	5.43	.00	29.35	65.22	99	11	9.0/1	12	0	17	0	0	0
002 BN 06 REGT	55.43	7.61	20.55	16.30	75	5	15.0/1	25	0	18	0	0	7
003 BN 06 REGT	57.61	.00	4.35	8.70	130	5	26.3/1	14	4	21	0	0	0
004 BN 06 REGT	.00	4.35	22.83	72.83	235	6	39.2/1	28	1	38	0	21	13
AVERAGE	49.18	12.50	15.30	17.02	90.3	5.6	16.1/1	15.3	5.3	18.6	.00	3.2	10.9
													.4

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

1 CDR'S 51 INFANTRY REGIMENT

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS					CACHES				
	PCT TIME CBT DPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY CIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	LES	AMMO	
INF REGT RATINGS														
51 REGT	8.15	23.37	60.60	.82	246	30	8.2/1	58	1	60	4	9	64	15
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 51 REGT	7.61	29.35	54.35	1.09	17	4	4.3/1	1	1	3	0	2	0	1
002 BN 51 REGT	.00	16.30	79.35	.00	60	17	3.5/1	7	0	11	4	0	10	8
003 BN 51 REGT	6.52	33.70	53.25	1.09	41	6	6.8/1	19	0	17	0	6	1	1
004 BN 51 REGT	18.48	14.13	55.43	1.09	128	3	42.7/1	31	0	29	0	1	53	5
AVERAGE	8.15	23.36	60.59	.81	61.5	7.5	8.2/1	17.5	.2	15.0	1.0	2.2	16.0	3.7

CONFIDENTIAL

## 2 CDRPS 22 INFANTRY DIVISION

EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES						
UNITS	PCT TIME CPT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY E.TM	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	100 LBS	133 LBS	AMMO
INF REGT RATINGS														
40 REGT	46.74	7.88	30.43	.27	202	19	10.6/1	15	20	49	0	0	514	2
41 REGT	22.83	13.32	36.58	5.15	213	22	9.7/1	14	1	59	3	26	111	4
47 REGT	48.64	31.25	11.41	.30	293	15	18.3/1	20	0	83	1	27	350	258
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 40 REGT	79.24	.00	7.61	.30	23	8	2.9/1	4	2	6	0	0	0	3
002 BN 40 REGT	64.13	16.30	.00	.30	10	1	10.0/1	1	0	3	0	0	500	0
003 BN 40 REGT	2.17	.00	94.57	.30	148	10	14.8/1	9	18	33	0	0	14	2
004 BN 40 REGT	42.39	15.22	19.57	1.39	21	0		1	0	0	0	0	0	2
001 BN 41 REGT	23.91	48.51	18.48	.00	57	10	5.7/1	3	0	17	2	0	6	2
002 BN 41 REGT	23.91	.00	48.91	.30	78	1	78.0/1	0	0	21	0	0	101	1
003 BN 41 REGT	34.78	2.17	4.35	19.57	27	5	5.4/1	8	1	4	0	0	1	3
004 BN 41 REGT	8.70	2.17	75.00	1.39	51	6	8.5/1	3	0	17	1	26	3	1
001 BN 47 REGT	44.57	29.35	10.87	.30	147	5	29.4/1	3	0	41	0	10	100	1
002 BN 47 REGT	26.09	27.17	34.73	.30	73	5	12.2/1	10	0	25	1	0	240	256
003 BN 47 REGT	52.17	47.83	.00	.00	7	3	2.3/1	0	0	7	0	7	0	0
004 BN 47 REGT	71.74	20.65	.00	.30	66	2	33.0/1	7	0	10	0	10	10	1
AVERAGE	39.40	17.48	25.17	1.81	59.0	4.6	12.3/1	4.0	1.7	15.9	.3	4.4	81.2	22.8

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2 CJRPS 23 INFANTRY DIVISION

EFFORT

RESULTS

UNITS	PCT TIME CST DPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY CIA	CAS RATIO	RESULTS				CACHES		
								WEAPNS	WEAPNS	WEAPNS	WEAPNS	WEAPNS	WEAPNS	WEAPNS
INF REGT RATINGS														
44 REGT	71.47	10.05	4.35	.00	244	14	17.4/1	56	1	61	0	0	22	0
45 REGT	56.52	1.36	.00	.00	195	15	13.0/1	19	0	74	0	1	99	1
53 REGT	75.54	3.53	.00	.00	137	6	12.5/1	4	0	45	5	0	42	2
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 44 REGT	70.65	19.57	.00	.00	101	7	14.4/1	53	1	22	0	0	20	0
002 BN 44 REGT	77.17	.00	.00	.00	45	1	45.0/1	1	0	15	0	0	0	0
003 BN 44 REGT	59.78	9.78	17.39	.00	47	1	47.0/1	1	0	7	0	0	2	0
004 BN 44 REGT	78.26	10.87	.00	.00	50	5	10.0/1	1	0	17	0	0	0	0
001 BN 45 REGT	54.35	3.26	.00	.00	28	5	5.6/1	0	0	8	0	0	0	0
002 BN 45 REGT	60.87	.00	.00	.00	54	5	10.2/1	16	0	9	0	0	1	0
003 BN 45 REGT	79.35	.00	.00	.00	72	3	24.0/1	1	0	34	0	1	18	1
004 BN 45 REGT	31.52	2.17	.00	.00	41	2	20.5/1	2	0	23	0	0	70	0
001 BN 53 REGT	57.61	.00	.00	.00	63	2	31.5/1	0	0	14	0	0	0	0
002 BN 53 REGT	83.70	.00	.00	.00	55	0		3	0	19	0	0	3	1
003 BN 53 REGT	79.35	.00	.00	.00	3	0		1	0	4	0	0	1	1
004 BN 53 REGT	81.52	14.13	.00	.00	16	4	1.8/1	0	0	8	5	0	38	0
AVERAGE	67.84	4.98	1.44	.00	48.0	2.9	14.5/1	6.5	.0	15.0	.4	.0	13.5	.2

CONFIDENTIAL

3 CDRS 05 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	PCT TIME CBT OPS	EFFORT			PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY BLTN	FRIENDLY KIA	RESULTS		CACHES			
		PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME ACTIVE					CAS RATIO	CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	LBS AMMO

INF REGT RATINGS

07 REGT	92.39	.54	.00	.00	.00	.00	15	8	1.5/1	0	11	0	5	7
08 REGT	63.86	26.63	.00	.00	.00	.00	49	10	4.9/1	3	22	7	2	5
09 REGT	66.30	31.79	.00	.00	.00	.00	51	11	3.9/1	1	33	161	1	5

INF BN RATINGS

001 BN 07 REGT	98.91	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	10	7	1.4/1	0	9	0	0	0
002 BN 07 REGT	93.48	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	3	0		0	0	0	5	7
003 BN 07 REGT	92.39	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	3	1	1.0/1	0	0	0	0	0
004 BN 07 REGT	84.78	2.17	.00	.00	.00	.00	3	0	3.0/1	0	2	0	0	0
001 BN 08 REGT	65.22	16.30	.00	.00	.00	.00	25	1	25.0/1	0	10	0	0	1
002 BN 08 REGT	55.43	41.30	.00	.00	.00	.00	10	3	3.3/1	1	8	0	0	0
003 BN 08 REGT	85.87	2.17	.00	.00	.00	.00	3	3	1.0/1	0	0	5	0	0
004 BN 08 REGT	48.91	46.74	.00	.00	.00	.00	11	3	3.7/1	2	0	2	0	3
001 BN 09 REGT	83.70	9.78	.00	.00	.00	.00	21	2	10.5/1	1	4	0	2	1
002 BN 09 REGT	47.83	52.17	.00	.00	.00	.00	17	2	8.5/1	6	19	125	1	5
003 BN 09 REGT	43.48	55.43	.00	.00	.00	.00	3	0		0	2	36	0	0
004 BN 09 REGT	90.22	9.78	.00	.00	.00	.00	13	7	1.4/1	0	0	0	0	0
AVERAGE	74.18	19.65	.00	.00	.00	.00	9.7	2.4	3.5/1	.3	5.5	14.0	.6	1.4

C-7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

# 3 CBRPS 18 INFANTRY DIVISION

## EFFORT

## RESULTS

## CACHES

UNITS	PCT TIME CST OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIX	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	RESULTS			CACHES			
								CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS FOOT	100 LBS FOOT	100 LBS AMMO		
43 REGT	71.74	14.40	.00	.00	132	25	4.9/1	6	0	102	1	0	0	10
48 REGT	49.18	0.16	.00	.00	159	24	6.1/1	4	1	34	5	4	1	11
52 REGT	75.27	2.45	.00	.00	154	18	8.6/1	8	3	44	0	16	0	7

## INF REGT RATINGS

43 REGT	71.74	14.40	.00	.00	132	25	4.9/1	6	0	102	1	0	0	10
48 REGT	49.18	0.16	.00	.00	159	24	6.1/1	4	1	34	5	4	1	11
52 REGT	75.27	2.45	.00	.00	154	18	8.6/1	8	3	44	0	16	0	7

## INF BR RATINGS

001 BV 43 REGT	76.09	.00	.00	.00	45	6	6.4/1	2	0	14	1	0	0	0
002 BV 43 REGT	95.65	.00	.00	.00	4	2	2.0/1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
003 BV 43 REGT	79.35	.00	.00	.00	79	17	4.4/1	2	0	87	0	0	0	10
004 BV 43 REGT	35.87	57.61	.00	.00	4	0		2	0	1	0	0	0	0
001 BV 48 REGT	42.39	16.30	.00	.00	12	4	3.0/1	0	0	4	1	0	0	0
002 BV 48 REGT	26.09	60.87	.00	.00	5	0		1	1	1	0	0	0	0
003 BV 48 REGT	64.13	21.74	.00	.00	34	6	4.5/1	2	0	6	2	4	1	5
004 BV 48 REGT	64.13	21.74	.00	.00	106	14	7.6/1	1	0	23	2	0	0	6
001 BV 52 REGT	85.87	.00	.00	.00	14	0		1	2	8	0	4	0	7
002 BV 52 REGT	65.22	2.17	.00	.00	89	2	40.0/1	1	1	26	0	10	0	0
003 BV 52 REGT	70.55	7.61	.00	.00	57	16	3.6/1	5	0	10	0	0	0	0
004 BV 52 REGT	79.35	.00	.00	.00	3	0		1	0	0	0	2	0	0
AVERAGE	65.39	15.67	.00	.00	37.1	5.5	6.3/1	1.5	.3	15.0	.5	1.5	.0	2.3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2 CDRPS 42 INFANTRY REGIMENT

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES			
	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	FRIENDLY	GAS	ENEMY	WEAPONS	WEAPONS	WEAPONS	FOOD	AMMO
	CBT OPS	SECURITY	AC	STATIC	CIA	RATIO	ELIM	CPTD	SURR	CPTD	LOST	LBS
INF REGT RATINGS												
42 REGT	57.07	26.09	.54	4.08	20	5.0/1	1	0	22	2	7	42
INF BN RATINGS												
001 BN 42 REGT	56.52	18.48	.00	15.30	0	1.5/1	1	0	8	0	7	0
002 BN 42 REGT	58.70	40.22	.00	.00	17	2.5/1	0	0	7	0	0	0
003 BN 42 REGT	79.35	17.39	2.17	.00	2	32.0/1	0	0	1	2	0	0
004 BN 42 REGT	33.70	28.26	.00	.00	1	32.0/1	0	0	6	0	0	0
AVERAGE	57.06	26.08	.54	4.07	5.0	5.0/1	.2	.0	5.5	.5	1.7	10.5

CONFIDENTIAL

## 3 CDR'S 25 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES				
	PCT TIME C3T OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY CIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SUPR	WEAPONS LST	WEAPONS	FOOD	LBS AMMO	
INF REGT RATINGS													
46 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	203	8	22.6/1	25	0	33	0	0	40
49 REGT	94.29	4.89	.00	.00	225	25	9.0/1	32	67	101	7	11	1
50 REGT	42.93	.00	52.17	.00	81	6	14.0/1	30	1	22	0	0	0
INF BN RATINGS													
001 BN 46 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	34	2	11.3/1	5	0	5	0	0	0
002 BN 46 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	93	3	31.0/1	11	0	16	0	0	0
003 BN 46 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	58	1	58.0/1	5	0	10	0	0	40
004 BN 46 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	18	2	9.0/1	4	0	2	0	0	0
001 BN 49 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	26	2	13.0/1	1	0	7	0	0	0
002 BN 49 REGT	80.43	19.57	.00	.00	8	0		1	0	4	0	0	0
003 BN 49 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	69	16	4.3/1	17	0	17	7	11	8
004 BN 49 REGT	95.08	.00	.00	.00	95	4	23.8/1	10	67	61	0	0	0
001 BN 50 REGT	57.61	.00	40.22	.00	23	2	11.5/1	17	1	2	0	0	0
002 BN 50 REGT	36.96	.00	63.04	.00	31	1	31.0/1	8	0	4	0	0	0
003 BN 50 REGT	33.70	.00	51.09	.00	17	1	17.0/1	2	0	10	0	0	0
004 BN 50 REGT	43.48	.00	54.35	.00	13	2	6.5/1	3	0	6	0	0	0
AVERAGE	79.07	1.63	17.39	.00	42.7	3.0	12.9/1	6.6	5.2	12.0	.5	1.0	.6
													3.1

C-10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4 CORPS 07 INFANTRY DIVISION

				EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES			
UNITS	PCT TIME CET OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	LBS AMMO		
INF REGT RATINGS														
10 REGT	.00	8.70	91.30	.00	404	28	14.1/1	89	35	39	0	0	5	
11 REGT	61.96	25.00	3.53	.00	377	28	13.5/1	192	0	75	6	0	5	
12 REGT	66.85	13.59	8.42	.00	220	17	12.9/1	43	0	51	0	0	0	
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 10 REGT	.00	8.70	91.30	.00	108	3	36.0/1	18	14	12	0	0	0	
002 BN 10 REGT	.00	8.70	91.30	.00	101	14	7.2/1	15	11	12	0	0	0	
003 BN 10 REGT	.00	8.70	91.30	.00	98	7	14.0/1	37	2	8	0	0	1	
004 BN 10 REGT	.00	8.70	91.30	.00	97	4	24.3/1	19	8	7	0	0	4	
001 BN 11 REGT	63.04	25.00	.00	.00	51	1	51.0/1	13	0	10	0	0	1	
002 BN 11 REGT	69.57	25.00	.00	.00	129	3	43.0/1	89	0	19	0	0	2	
003 BN 11 REGT	60.87	21.74	6.52	.00	135	18	7.5/1	57	0	36	6	24	1	
004 BN 11 REGT	54.35	28.26	7.51	.00	62	6	10.3/1	33	0	10	0	54	0	
001 BN 12 REGT	52.17	34.78	.00	.00	45	8	5.6/1	7	0	9	0	0	0	
002 BN 12 REGT	54.35	5.43	33.70	.00	60	1	60.0/1	13	0	10	0	0	0	
003 BN 12 REGT	92.39	.00	.00	.00	27	3	9.0/1	2	0	11	0	0	0	
004 BN 12 REGT	68.48	14.13	.00	.00	88	5	17.6/1	21	0	21	0	4	0	
AVERAGE	42.93	15.76	34.42	.00	83.4	6.0	13.9/1	27.0	2.9	13.7	.5	6.8	.8	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



4 CJRPC 09 INFANTRY DIVISION

EFFORT

RESULTS

CACHES

UNITS	PCT TIME CMT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY		WEAPONS		CACHES		
								CPTD	SURR	CPTD	LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	LBS
INF REGT RATINGS														
14 REGT	86.96	2.45	.00	.00	95	76	1.3/1	2	0	44	10	1	24	31
15 REGT	77.72	3.53	.00	.00	96	54	1.8/1	19	0	14	2	0	0	10
16 REGT	89.13	.00	.00	.00	269	25	10.8/1	13	0	53	0	0	8	3
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 14 REGT	91.30	1.09	.00	.00	19	18	1.1/1	0	0	9	3	0	3	3
002 BN 14 REGT	78.26	2.17	.00	.00	21	19	1.1/1	0	0	8	4	0	14	7
003 BN 14 REGT	88.04	2.17	.00	.00	33	19	1.7/1	0	0	22	2	0	7	11
004 BN 14 REGT	90.22	4.35	.00	.00	22	20	1.1/1	2	0	5	1	1	0	10
001 BN 15 REGT	51.99	.00	.00	.00	1	8	0.1/1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
002 BN 15 REGT	84.78	2.17	.00	.00	43	9	4.8/1	17	0	1	0	0	0	0
003 BN 15 REGT	81.52	11.96	.00	.00	21	17	1.2/1	2	0	11	0	0	0	0
004 BN 15 REGT	93.48	.00	.00	.00	31	20	1.6/1	0	0	2	1	0	0	4
001 BN 16 REGT	81.52	.00	.00	.00	97	9	10.8/1	4	0	12	0	0	0	2
002 BN 16 REGT	93.48	.00	.00	.00	58	8	7.3/1	0	0	10	0	0	0	2
003 BN 16 REGT	93.48	.00	.00	.00	69	6	11.5/1	6	0	10	0	0	6	0
004 BN 16 REGT	88.04	.00	.00	.00	45	2	22.5	3	0	21	0	0	1	1
AVERAGE	84.60	1.99	.00	.00	38.3	12.9	3.0/1	2.8	.0	9.2	1.0	.0	2.6	3.6

INF REGT RATINGS

INF BN RATINGS

C-12

CONFIDENTIAL

# 4 CORPS 21 INFANTRY DIVISION

EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES					
UNITS	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY		WEAPONS		100 LBS FOOD	100 LBS AMMO
								CPTD	SURR	CPTD	LOST		
INF REGT RATINGS													
31 REGT	41.85	16.85	1.90	10.60	224	17	13.2/1	37	0	34	3	0	1
32 REGT	63.86	9.78	.30	.30	255	30	8.5/1	6	0	51	0	88	55
33 REGT	47.01	23.91	15.69	.30	433	71	5.9/1	7	22	76	0	5	8
INF BN RATINGS													
001 BN 31 REGT	46.74	13.04	.00	13.04	68	6	11.3/1	10	0	11	0	0	3
002 BN 31 REGT	46.74	10.87	.00	.00	43	2	21.5/1	7	0	6	3	0	0
003 BN 31 REGT	64.13	11.96	.00	.00	81	8	10.1/1	10	0	12	0	0	0
004 BN 31 REGT	9.78	31.52	7.51	29.35	32	1	32.0/1	10	0	5	0	0	1
001 BN 32 REGT	80.43	.00	.00	.00	117	8	14.6/1	0	0	23	0	0	1
002 BN 32 REGT	67.39	9.78	.00	.00	70	8	8.8/1	0	0	17	0	5	3
003 BN 32 REGT	46.74	17.39	.00	.00	39	7	5.6/1	0	0	6	0	37	5
004 BN 32 REGT	60.87	11.96	.00	.00	29	7	4.1/1	6	0	5	0	46	0
001 BN 33 REGT	20.65	15.22	47.83	.00	67	12	5.6/1	0	11	18	0	3	0
002 BN 33 REGT	53.26	28.26	.00	.00	123	26	4.4/1	0	10	23	0	0	5
003 BN 33 REGT	43.48	38.04	14.13	.00	123	16	7.7/1	1	0	21	0	2	3
004 BN 33 REGT	70.65	14.13	.00	.00	120	17	7.1/1	6	1	14	0	0	0
AVERAGE	50.90	16.84	5.79	3.53	76.0	9.8	7.6/1	4.1	1.8	13.4	.2	7.7	5.3

CONFIDENTIAL

C-13

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES					
	PCT TIME -3Y OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY CIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	CACHES				
										WEAPONS	FOOD	LBS AMMO		
001 ABV BN	64.13	27.17	.00	.00	12	2	6.0/1	1	0	6	0	80	2	11
002 ABV BN	15.22	.00	.00	.00	57	9	6.3/1	10	0	22	0	0	0	0
003 ABN BN	17.39	64.13	.00	.00		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
005 ABV BN	25.00	23.91	.00	.00	66	6	11.0/1	9	0	16	0	0	0	0
006 ABV BN	77.17	18.48	.00	.00	1	0		0	0	0	0	63	420	1
007 ABV BN	73.91	18.48	.00	.00	49	3	16.3/1	10	0	27	0	4	0	0
008 ABV BN	65.22	.00	.00	.00	6	2	3.0/1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
009 ABV BN	72.83	4.35	.00	.00	11	9	1.2/1	3	0	5	0	1	0	5
011 ABV BN	36.96	15.22	.00	.00	2	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AVERAGE	49.75	19.08	.00	.00	22.7	3.4	6.7/1	3.7	.0	8.4	.0	16.4	46.8	1.8

CONFIDENTIAL

ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES			
	PCT TIME C3T OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY BLTN	FRIENDLY CIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	100 LBS FOOD	100 LBS AMMO
001 CAV SQDN	36.14	26.51	.00	.00	51	3	17.0/1	4	0	0	0	0
002 CAV SQDN	81.52	.00	.00	.00	9	2	4.5/1	0	0	0	0	0
003 CAV SQDN	7.61	78.26	.00	3.26	8	0		0	0	0	0	0
004 CAV SQDN	1.09	40.22	40.22	.00	44	3	14.7/1	16	0	0	0	0
005 CAV SQDN	34.78	.00	.00	.00	15	5	3.0/1	3	1	0	0	1
006 CAV SQDN	.00	100.00	.00	.00		0		0	0	0	0	0
007 CAV SQDN	35.87	63.04	.00	.00	16	0		0	0	0	0	0
008 CAV SQDN	.00	78.26	.00	.00	9	1	9.0/1	9	0	0	0	0
009 CAV SQDN	75.35	.00	.00	.00	27	6	4.5/1	4	4	0	22	0
010 CAV SQDN	55.43	1.09	.00	.00	22	0		4	0	0	0	0
011 CAV SQDN	83.70	16.30	.00	.00	3	4	.8/1	0	0	0	0	0
012 CAV SQDN	80.43	.00	.00	.00	3	4		1	0	2	0	0
014 CAV SQDN	9.78	89.13	.00	.00	2	1	2.0/1	0	0	0	0	0
015 LAV SQDN	51.69	2.25	.00	.00	77	17	4.5/1	6	2	18	0	2
016 CAV SQDN	84.78	.00	.00	.00		5		0	0	0	0	2
017 CAV SQDN	.00	40.22	48.91	.00	13	5	2.6/1	9	3	0	15	2
018 CAV SQDN	53.26	.00	.00	.00	380	9	42.2/1	28	0	68	0	2
AVERAGE	40.91	31.57	5.28	.19	42.4	3.5	12.1/1	4.9	.5	8.8	2.1	.4

C-15

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RANGER BATTALIONS					EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES			
UNITS	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY CIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY		WEAPONS		CACHES			
								CPTD	SURR	CPTD	LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	AMMO	
011 RANGER BN	53.26	15.22	10.87	.30	30	4	7.5/1	13	0	5	0	0	0	0	
021 RANGER BN	.00	55.43	43.48	1.39	14	3	3.5/1	4	1	2	0	0	0	1	
022 RANGER BN	71.74	13.04	.00	.00	14	2	7.0/1	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	
023 RANGER BN	61.96	28.26	.00	.00	4	7	.6/1	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	
030 RANGER BN	57.01	37.38	.00	.00	1	0		0	0	3	0	2	1	5	
031 RANGER BN	82.61	.00	.00	.00	19	15	1.3/1	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	
032 RANGER BN	85.87	.00	.00	.00	41	15	2.7/1	14	1	7	0	0	0	0	
033 RANGER BN	18.48	32.61	.00	.00	3	3	1.0/1	0	0	2	0	1	1	1	
034 RANGER BN	32.79	59.02	.00	.00	11	4	2.2/1	3	0	5	1	0	0	0	
035 RANGER BN	15.22	79.35	.00	.00	2	3	.7/1	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	
036 RANGER BN	83.70	.00	.00	.00	40	6	6.7/1	8	0	12	0	0	0	0	
037 RANGER BN	.00	.00	40.22	.00	39	4	9.8/1	4	0	3	0	0	0	1	
038 RANGER BN	42.39	28.26	.00	.00	14	1	14.0/1	0	0	7	0	0	2	8	
039 RANGER BN	.00	44.57	53.26	.00	50	8	6.3/1	17	5	6	0	0	3	0	
041 RANGER BN	77.17	.00	.00	.00	30	18	1.7/1	4	0	2	0	0	6	1	
042 RANGER BN	48.91	6.52	.00	.00	34	12	2.8/1	0	0	2	0	0	3	3	
043 RANGER BN	70.65	.00	.00	.00	25	1	25.0/1	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	
044 RANGER BN	69.57	.00	.00	.00	79	6	15.2/1	41	0	12	0	27	0	2	
051 RANGER BN	65.22	18.48	.00	.00	5	17	.3/1	2	0	2	0	12	6	3	
052 RANGER BN	73.91	.00	.00	.00	106	2	53.0	1	0	31	0	0	20	0	
AVERAGE	50.87	20.39	7.45	.35	28.1	6.5	4.2/1	6.3	.3	5.5	.0	2.1	2.4	1.2	

C-16

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

VIETNAMESE MARINE DIVISION

EFFORT

RESULTS

CACHES

100  
LBS  
FOOD  
AMMO

100  
LBS  
FOOD

WEAPONS

CPTD LOST

CPTD SURR

CAS  
RATIO

FRIENDLY  
KIA

ENEMY  
ELIM

PCT TIME  
PAC  
STATIC

PCT TIME  
PAC  
ACTIVE

PCT TIME  
SECURITY

PCT TIME  
CST OPS

UNITS

001 MARINE BN

002 MARINE BN

003 MARINE BN

004 MARINE BN

005 MARINE BN

006 MARINE BN

007 MARINE BN

008 MARINE BN

009 MARINE BN

AVERAGE

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

57.61

80.43

93.48

57.61

70.65

79.35

100.00

80.43

86.04

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT FOR 3RD & 4TH QTR CY 70

ORGANIZATION	PCT TIME ON COMBAT OPS			PCT TIME ON SECURITY			PCT TIME ON PAC ACTIVE			PCT TIME ON PAC STATIC			PCT TIME ON RESERVE			PCT TIME ON TRAINING			PCT TIME ON REHABILITATION		
	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	PCT	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	PCT	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	PCT	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	PCT	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	PCT	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	PCT	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	
01 DIV	91.54	81.10	13.73	13.69	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.10	.00	.00	3.35	5.01	1.29	.19			
02 DIV	52.78	46.99	14.09	13.66	16.06	18.58	10.37	15.44	.07	.00	5.83	4.64	.81	.68							
51 REG	37.70	5.33	37.71	20.08	18.85	66.80	.00	1.23	.20	.41	3.28	3.89	2.87								
I MR	65.80	59.51	16.77	14.46	8.11	14.85	3.77	5.76	.10	.05	4.02	4.67	1.43	.70							
22 DIV	36.25	35.66	18.16	17.90	21.61	26.91	4.61	2.73	7.38	5.19	8.06	6.28	3.93	5.33							
23 DIV	57.99	67.21	10.98	5.33	1.15	2.19	4.34	.00	3.39	3.28	19.58	18.85	2.57	3.14							
42 REG	53.46	58.61	21.95	20.08	.00	.82	.00	6.15	.41	14.07	22.56	1.23	1.63	2.05							
11 MR	48.03	52.46	15.62	12.82	9.76	12.59	3.83	2.05	4.67	5.21	15.07	10.95	3.02	3.92							
05 DIV	74.80	76.09	14.50	19.40	.00	.00	.00	.00	.88	1.78	8.47	1.91	1.36	.82							
18 DIV	71.41	61.20	11.52	14.34	.00	.00	.00	.00	8.27	7.65	6.17	6.28	2.64	10.52							
25 DIV	73.31	82.74	.61	2.46	23.17	15.85	.00	.00	.14	.41	.61	.14	2.17	.41							
111 MR	73.17	72.68	8.88	12.07	7.72	5.28	.00	.00	3.09	3.28	5.08	2.78	2.06	3.92							
07 DIV	42.62	47.40	21.82	11.48	22.97	37.43	.00	.00	.00	.00	4.54	1.37	8.06	2.32							
09 DIV	74.66	84.70	7.45	.00	.00	.00	3.59	.00	.34	.27	7.66	5.46	6.30	9.56							
21 DIV	46.21	49.73	6.23	21.17	18.63	4.78	7.72	.00	3.12	1.23	8.20	7.79	9.89	15.30							
IV MR	54.49	60.61	11.83	13.88	13.47	14.07	3.77	.00	1.15	.50	6.80	4.87	8.08	9.06							
INF TOTALS	60.99	61.89	13.05	12.50	9.91	11.57	2.76	1.86	2.16	2.13	7.39	5.53	3.74	4.51							
CV 1 MR	32.52	34.84	44.11	34.84	10.16	24.59	.00	.00	2.03	.00	7.93	4.10	3.25	1.64							
CV 2 MR	1.36	8.20	87.53	78.69	.00	.00	.00	1.64	5.42	.00	5.69	10.93	.00	.55							
CV 3 MR	74.26	27.81	7.43	6.95	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.82	.00	.33	39.07	16.17	26.16							
CV 4 MR	60.16	67.21	21.63	20.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	9.43	5.57	1.30	.00	7.48	7.21							
CV TOTALS	47.31	37.62	34.49	30.08	2.40	5.80	.00	.29	4.76	1.64	3.36	14.31	7.68	10.25							
RN 1 MR	35.23	.00	31.98	32.79	7.59	53.55	.00	.55	10.57	9.84	12.20	2.73	2.44	.55							
RN 2 MR	37.57	66.67	24.26	12.02	.00	5.46	.00	.00	16.86	7.65	21.30	7.10	.00	1.09							
RN 3 MR	48.98	53.28	34.40	27.80	.00	.00	2.67	.00	6.77	10.62	4.63	5.60	3.03	2.70							
RN 4 MR	60.98	67.51	6.50	.00	6.02	.00	4.88	.00	11.06	14.43	3.41	4.59	7.15	11.48							
RN TOTALS	47.52	51.30	26.06	19.01	2.63	9.08	2.42	.08	10.10	11.02	7.76	5.13	3.52	4.37							
AR DIV	37.49	50.46	12.65	22.59	.00	.00	.00	.00	9.94	10.02	37.76	6.74	2.17	10.20							
VNMC	70.73	78.32	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.72	.00	19.42	16.21	6.78	2.73	1.36	2.73							
SPEC UNITS	49.61	51.37	22.20	19.90	1.70	5.06	1.17	.12	9.95	8.79	11.15	7.86	4.22	6.90							
ARVN/VNMC	57.66	58.83	15.73	14.65	7.51	9.68	2.30	1.36	4.44	4.07	8.49	6.21	3.88	5.20							

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## ANNEX D

### Advisors' Assessment Tables

These tables depict the advisors' assessment of divisions, separate regiments, and special organizations as derived from responses to the Quarterly Effectiveness Report (SEER Questionnaire as revised, effective 4th Qtr CY 69). Battalion ratings are derived from the combination of battalion and regimental advisors' assessments. The regimental ratings are derived from the combination of regimental and division advisors' assessments.

# CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

1 DIVISION 1 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PER S/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV HQ RATING	94.67	80.95	95.00	80.00	80.00	63.33	88.28	94.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
1 REGT	97.78	70.00	100.00	100.00	60.00	60.00	87.27	92.00
2 REGT	97.23	72.73	100.00	80.00	70.00	60.00	83.48	92.00
3 REGT	98.57	89.09	100.00	100.00	80.00	80.00	92.41	94.00
54 REGT	89.29	76.36	85.00	73.33	70.00	60.00	75.86	86.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	95.74	77.05	96.25	88.33	70.00	65.00	84.76	91.00
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 1 REGT	74.78	78.46	C.0	90.00	70.00	65.00	80.00	80.00
2 BN 1 REGT	91.00	80.00	C.0	90.00	73.33	66.67	80.00	91.67
3 BN 1 REGT	98.40	90.00	80.00	100.00	84.00	86.67	94.29	96.67
4 BN 1 REGT	97.69	81.33	80.00	100.00	96.67	78.46	97.50	95.00
1 BN 2 REGT	96.42	77.22	100.00	86.00	90.00	89.37	90.40	96.67
2 BN 2 REGT	86.67	82.50	C.0	71.67	73.33	73.85	75.00	84.17
3 BN 2 REGT	93.23	83.57	C.0	73.33	80.00	58.71	83.41	95.00
4 BN 2 REGT	93.09	86.67	100.00	57.50	66.67	61.25	73.06	95.00
5 BN 2 REGT	92.17	81.21	100.00	60.00	83.33	77.50	77.04	89.52
1 BN 3 REGT	100.00	92.22	100.00	80.00	93.33	82.50	88.97	95.00
2 BN 3 REGT	98.52	93.33	100.00	80.00	93.33	76.00	87.59	98.33
3 BN 3 REGT	95.56	92.22	100.00	80.00	93.33	75.00	84.83	95.00
4 BN 3 REGT	94.07	94.44	100.00	80.00	93.33	76.25	88.28	95.00
1 BN 54 REGT	89.20	84.44	50.00	48.00	81.67	83.12	81.60	85.83
2 BN 54 REGT	81.92	73.89	75.00	53.33	63.53	50.00	52.55	55.83
3 BN 54 REGT	85.20	84.00	86.67	52.00	66.67	56.87	73.85	82.50

P 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1 DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
INF BN RATINGS								
4 BN 54 REGT	79.26	80.00	80.00	82.86	69.33	54.37	69.60	85.83
INF BN AVERAGE	89.84	84.44	91.67	75.57	80.63	71.27	81.06	89.24

D-3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2 DIVISION 1 CORPS									
ORGANIZATION		OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV HQ RATING		56.00	70.48	82.50	93.33	70.00	56.57	78.95	85.00
REGT HQ RATINGS									
4 REGT		57.33	74.55	85.00	90.00	85.00	60.00	89.82	89.00
5 REGT		54.29	78.10	50.00	92.00	85.00	66.00	79.59	85.00
6 REGT		55.71	74.55	77.50	93.33	70.00	58.18	67.69	79.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE		55.78	75.73	84.17	91.78	80.00	61.39	79.03	84.33
INF BN RATINGS									
1 BN 4 REGT		82.41	82.22	50.00	70.00	81.67	61.25	74.00	76.67
2 BN 4 REGT		75.36	80.00	52.50	75.00	71.67	55.62	66.67	68.33
3 BN 4 REGT		91.64	84.57	82.50	74.55	86.67	70.00	82.67	93.33
4 BN 4 REGT		90.88	85.00	85.00	68.85	85.00	59.38	76.67	91.67
1 BN 5 REGT		60.37	68.24	80.00	77.65	70.00	48.15	55.00	50.00
2 BN 5 REGT		81.89	81.33	80.00	100.00	76.67	51.25	71.25	76.67
3 BN 5 REGT		81.42	80.00	85.00	96.00	73.33	50.62	69.60	79.17
4 BN 5 REGT		91.54	80.62	55.00	83.33	92.50	62.50	81.33	83.33
1 BN 6 REGT		76.79	76.11	82.50	67.06	81.67	66.25	67.41	83.33
2 BN 6 REGT		70.00	73.33	55.00	67.78	63.33	56.00	63.87	58.33
3 BN 6 REGT		89.82	78.86	46.67	72.94	86.67	70.00	65.38	89.17
4 BN 6 REGT		84.64	77.14	67.50	72.00	75.00	66.45	55.47	81.67
INF BN AVERAGE		81.40	78.95	78.47	77.10	78.68	59.79	69.11	77.64

D-4  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

22 DIVISION 2 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV HQ RATING	88.28	65.47	77.50	80.00	65.00	46.67	75.79	88.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
40 REGT	93.33	74.74	88.57	85.00	85.00	60.00	85.00	92.63
41 REGT	85.00	70.53	82.50	70.00	65.00	45.45	73.33	86.00
42 REGT	88.57	56.67	80.00	88.00	65.00	51.67	61.60	79.00
47 REGT	84.28	85.00	72.50	100.00	80.00	51.67	90.36	87.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	90.30	71.73	80.89	85.75	73.75	52.20	75.07	86.16
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 40 REGT	85.66	85.00	90.00	52.00	96.67	68.12	89.15	79.17
2 BN 40 REGT	85.09	87.22	92.00	65.71	86.67	82.86	91.48	92.50
3 BN 40 REGT	83.82	88.82	92.50	60.00	93.33	65.00	88.97	95.00
4 BN 40 REGT	87.74	87.78	100.00	52.00	96.67	80.00	84.67	95.00
1 BN 41 REGT	83.85	78.57	92.50	56.00	72.50	40.00	58.67	78.18
2 BN 41 REGT	78.95	68.84	85.00	53.33	75.00	38.18	68.18	77.27
3 BN 41 REGT	76.84	74.20	80.00	78.18	80.00	69.52	60.98	75.00
4 BN 41 REGT	89.74	82.14	87.50	40.00	92.50	50.00	80.00	87.27
1 BN 42 REGT	85.60	68.75	85.00	57.14	75.00	61.25	65.00	81.67
2 BN 42 REGT	87.04	79.44	70.00	90.00	86.67	70.62	74.19	93.33
3 BN 42 REGT	81.67	78.89	97.50	73.33	90.00	62.00	78.04	85.00
4 BN 42 REGT	80.36	76.77	82.50	90.00	83.33	65.33	76.67	90.83
1 BN 47 REGT	76.30	84.44	66.67	73.33	76.67	60.00	67.14	68.33
2 BN 47 REGT	84.28	78.89	65.00	78.00	76.67	43.75	64.29	85.00
3 BN 47 REGT	80.74	77.50	65.00	82.50	73.33	65.00	73.57	76.67
4 BN 47 REGT	84.07	78.33	75.00	78.00	83.33	46.25	66.92	78.33

P5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

22 DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
INF BN RATINGS								
INF BN AVERAGE	85.74	75.73	82.89	67.47	83.65	60.40	74.24	83.66

P6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

23 DIVISION 2 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPFR EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV FC RATING	78.00	66.36	82.50	66.67	70.00	55.00	73.33	72.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
44 REGT	95.33	86.36	55.00	93.33	80.00	73.33	88.81	96.00
45 REGT	92.67	66.00	62.50	83.33	95.00	73.33	95.86	90.00
53 REGT	85.00	67.27	87.50	83.33	75.00	56.67	67.92	81.00
REGT FC AVERAGE	91.00	73.21	81.67	86.67	83.33	67.78	80.86	89.00
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 44 REGT	93.75	87.78	95.00	100.00	96.67	68.75	86.92	91.67
2 BN 44 REGT	90.00	87.78	55.00	80.00	100.00	76.25	84.62	93.33
3 BN 44 REGT	90.71	88.89	55.00	72.50	90.00	68.75	84.67	88.33
4 BN 44 REGT	93.10	88.33	87.50	80.00	96.67	80.00	88.28	93.33
1 BN 45 REGT	83.08	69.68	73.33	56.25	80.00	66.09	75.24	80.95
2 BN 45 REGT	79.20	78.13	82.86	75.29	88.00	71.54	78.92	73.91
3 BN 45 REGT	87.35	78.86	86.67	77.14	96.00	70.00	82.38	81.82
4 BN 45 REGT	88.63	79.37	80.00	71.11	92.00	70.00	90.26	94.78
1 BN 53 REGT	85.66	78.18	55.00	87.06	83.33	77.50	73.47	75.83
2 BN 53 REGT	84.53	77.22	77.50	81.43	83.33	63.75	69.57	85.83
3 BN 53 REGT	85.00	88.82	97.14	90.53	90.00	77.50	80.83	86.67
4 BN 53 REGT	79.17	75.37	95.00	75.00	71.67	64.62	68.09	78.33
INF BN AVERAGE	86.68	81.87	88.33	78.86	88.97	71.23	80.27	85.40

P-7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECTIVENESS	PER/S MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV HQ RATING	73.75	77.85	86.67	86.67	60.00	50.00	66.78	72.63
REGT HQ RATINGS								
7 REGT	96.00	85.45	87.50	88.00	80.00	66.67	87.41	92.00
8 REGT	88.15	61.00	50.00	80.00	70.00	46.67	65.17	80.00
9 REGT	88.67	69.47	50.00	76.67	35.00	75.00	68.00	82.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	50.94	71.98	85.17	81.56	61.67	62.78	73.53	84.67
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 7 REGT	93.88	87.78	100.00	75.00	96.67	71.88	93.85	90.83
2 BN 7 REGT	87.31	88.57	56.00	100.00	80.00	74.37	86.42	90.00
3 BN 7 REGT	51.60	91.67	100.00	100.00	86.67	78.75	95.77	94.17
4 BN 7 REGT	89.17	90.30	100.00	100.00	91.67	74.37	88.30	90.83
1 BN 8 REGT	84.62	76.25	100.00	85.71	70.00	62.67	75.33	89.57
2 BN 8 REGT	79.52	80.55	50.00	97.78	80.00	62.00	91.67	85.88
3 BN 8 REGT	78.64	72.50	100.00	68.57	70.00	71.00	78.86	83.16
4 BN 8 REGT	60.38	77.33	80.00	85.45	78.33	62.11	64.50	78.26
1 BN 9 REGT	90.91	80.00	50.00	46.67	80.00	53.33	66.00	88.00
2 BN 9 REGT	95.38	93.85	0.0	100.00	90.00	78.75	92.80	93.33
3 BN 9 REGT	78.26	66.15	80.00	80.00	63.33	47.50	55.38	74.55
4 BN 9 REGT	78.26	78.57	100.00	80.00	83.33	53.85	57.27	72.73
INF BN AVERAGE	85.66	81.96	94.18	84.93	80.00	65.88	78.85	85.94

P8

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

18 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	54.48	74.44	50.00	50.00	80.00	51.11	85.17	92.50
REGT HQ RATINGS								
43 REGT	95.71	72.00	100.00	90.00	80.00	35.00	77.50	80.00
48 REGT	90.00	74.00	0.0	80.00	70.00	40.00	71.30	84.71
52 REGT	94.55	63.16	100.00	85.67	80.00	70.00	78.46	85.71
REGT HQ AVERAGE	93.42	69.72	100.00	85.56	76.67	48.33	75.76	83.47
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 43 REGT	88.46	81.11	55.00	93.33	80.00	42.50	75.33	89.00
2 BN 43 REGT	73.60	78.86	52.50	94.00	73.33	42.50	71.67	75.45
3 BN 43 REGT	85.88	95.88	52.50	96.67	86.67	42.07	90.71	87.27
4 BN 43 REGT	88.24	85.00	55.00	93.33	80.00	42.50	75.33	91.82
1 BN 48 REGT	86.67	80.00	0.0	80.00	76.67	51.25	73.91	81.67
2 BN 48 REGT	95.56	84.44	93.33	80.00	93.33	52.50	80.87	86.67
3 BN 48 REGT	73.70	81.18	50.00	90.00	80.00	49.75	67.08	75.00
4 BN 48 REGT	82.59	81.18	80.00	90.00	73.33	55.62	77.45	80.83
1 BN 52 REGT	95.00	82.58	100.00	90.00	93.33	64.55	95.26	80.00
2 BN 52 REGT	94.55	78.13	100.00	90.00	93.33	64.14	84.74	70.00
3 BN 52 REGT	92.17	70.67	100.00	95.00	93.33	65.38	85.70	79.00
4 BN 52 REGT	83.85	68.75	100.00	95.00	93.33	65.38	82.63	72.00
INF BN AVERAGE	86.69	79.81	94.39	89.78	84.72	53.10	78.40	80.73

D-9

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

25 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	53.75	70.53	84.00	86.57	70.00	65.00	77.67	90.53
REGT HQ RATINGS								
46 REGT	90.67	74.00	55.00	80.00	70.00	70.00	77.96	92.00
49 REGT	56.00	78.18	50.00	80.00	70.00	63.33	84.29	96.00
50 REGT	92.86	65.00	85.00	80.00	70.00	56.67	67.14	86.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	53.17	73.76	50.00	80.00	70.00	63.33	76.46	91.33
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 46 REGT	94.23	87.10	86.67	100.00	90.00	59.37	89.78	94.17
2 BN 46 REGT	87.20	83.03	50.00	100.00	87.50	60.91	74.67	87.50
3 BN 46 REGT	52.16	85.81	85.00	100.00	80.00	56.67	75.65	93.33
4 BN 46 REGT	89.60	88.39	93.33	100.00	87.50	57.27	78.30	91.67
1 BN 49 REGT	91.64	89.41	97.50	56.00	73.33	68.75	90.71	90.00
2 BN 49 REGT	86.55	82.35	50.00	56.00	73.33	68.75	82.86	91.67
3 BN 49 REGT	83.64	82.35	50.00	56.00	76.67	68.75	82.18	83.33
4 BN 49 REGT	68.57	81.18	50.00	56.00	73.33	68.75	83.57	90.00
1 BN 50 REGT	52.00	57.14	70.00	80.00	57.78	34.17	50.00	54.55
2 BN 50 REGT	75.45	72.50	100.00	60.00	80.00	51.20	62.40	71.67
3 BN 50 REGT	81.30	73.55	100.00	95.00	86.67	53.64	49.05	80.00
4 BN 50 REGT	83.11	85.81	100.00	95.00	92.50	77.24	52.77	90.53
INF BN AVERAGE	83.75	90.75	51.04	79.50	79.88	61.29	72.66	84.89

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7 DIVISION 4 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV HQ RATING	86.21	80.00	88.67	70.00	70.00	50.01	83.20	89.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
10 REGT	92.14	81.82	88.57	80.00	65.00	58.33	74.14	89.00
11 REGT	87.14	71.82	82.86	76.67	75.00	45.00	80.36	83.00
12 REGT	89.63	71.11	82.86	76.67	75.00	30.00	61.67	82.00
REGT HC AVERAGE	89.64	74.92	84.76	77.78	71.67	44.44	72.05	84.67
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 10 REGT	97.86	90.00	50.00	88.89	90.00	71.25	66.67	95.00
2 BN 10 REGT	90.71	90.00	55.00	87.50	90.00	71.25	62.00	91.67
3 BN 10 REGT	97.14	90.00	50.00	88.89	90.00	71.25	66.67	95.00
4 BN 10 REGT	89.29	83.33	85.00	91.11	95.00	71.25	62.00	85.00
1 BN 11 REGT	81.43	78.82	50.00	71.11	80.00	53.75	80.87	78.33
2 BN 11 REGT	82.86	78.82	80.00	71.11	80.00	53.75	80.87	81.67
3 BN 11 REGT	85.00	78.82	80.00	71.11	80.00	53.75	80.87	85.00
4 BN 11 REGT	80.00	78.82	80.00	71.11	80.00	53.75	80.87	78.33
1 BN 12 REGT	88.09	82.76	53.33	100.00	93.33	62.22	75.86	84.55
2 BN 12 REGT	65.12	78.00	50.00	86.67	68.00	40.00	88.00	73.33
3 BN 12 REGT	82.45	74.78	84.00	100.00	96.67	56.00	77.27	87.37
4 BN 12 REGT	83.72	81.67	55.00	100.00	81.67	28.89	62.86	74.00
INF BN AVERAGE	85.30	82.15	86.86	85.62	84.56	57.26	73.73	84.10

D-11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9 DIVISION 4 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	73.1C	54.55	7C.00	53.33	50.00	40.00	58.67	70.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
14 REGT	69.33	55.56	77.14	60.00	55.00	35.00	50.18	60.00
15 REGT	74.0C	57.27	77.50	53.33	50.00	43.33	60.00	73.00
16 REGT	84.83	59.00	77.50	70.00	65.00	41.67	59.66	72.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	76.05	57.28	77.38	61.11	60.00	40.00	56.61	68.33
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 14 REGT	53.82	68.28	77.14	68.89	53.33	32.67	52.65	54.17
2 BN 14 REGT	52.0C	62.96	64.00	76.25	55.67	25.33	43.75	44.17
3 BN 14 REGT	66.42	66.90	62.50	63.53	73.33	40.00	52.77	58.33
4 BN 14 REGT	56.72	66.43	84.00	66.67	66.67	22.67	52.63	52.50
1 BN 15 REGT	79.38	68.67	85.00	73.33	72.50	57.00	65.33	80.00
2 BN 15 REGT	81.62	69.33	85.00	73.33	75.00	54.67	64.67	80.91
3 BN 15 REGT	81.62	69.33	85.00	73.33	75.00	54.67	64.00	79.09
4 BN 15 REGT	75.14	68.00	85.00	73.33	75.00	56.00	65.33	76.36
1 BN 16 REGT	86.42	64.67	57.50	80.0C	80.00	47.50	74.17	80.83
2 BN 16 REGT	88.57	76.15	52.50	75.71	75.00	53.13	65.79	80.00
3 BN 16 REGT	85.0C	68.46	100.00	80.0C	71.67	53.33	70.43	78.33
4 BN 16 REGT	71.28	56.36	50.00	45.0C	50.00	51.87	60.43	80.00
INF BN AVERAGE	73.05	67.13	80.64	70.78	69.51	46.57	61.00	70.39

D-12

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

21 DIVISION 4 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV HQ RATING	85.71	62.00	80.00	66.67	70.00	40.00	72.14	77.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
31 REGT	90.00	65.45	50.00	86.67	60.00	50.00	61.57	87.37
32 REGT	90.71	68.00	65.00	80.00	90.00	70.00	75.77	83.00
33 REGT	78.57	57.89	72.50	73.33	80.00	53.33	62.22	69.42
REGT HQ AVERAGE	86.42	63.78	75.83	80.00	76.67	57.78	66.52	79.60
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 31 REGT	82.35	80.00	75.00	80.00	71.67	53.55	61.82	88.33
2 BN 31 REGT	89.79	82.42	80.00	81.33	75.00	57.69	64.00	87.50
3 BN 31 REGT	83.40	74.12	82.50	89.41	86.67	50.32	66.91	87.50
4 BN 31 REGT	66.42	64.67	73.33	85.00	74.55	36.00	60.62	61.90
1 BN 32 REGT	50.00	76.67	57.50	90.77	93.33	80.00	78.67	85.00
2 BN 32 REGT	89.81	77.78	75.00	60.00	90.91	65.71	69.73	92.50
3 BN 32 REGT	85.22	84.21	72.00	86.67	84.00	71.43	0.0	90.48
4 BN 32 REGT	85.00	70.97	64.00	50.00	83.33	63.33	68.33	88.33
1 BN 33 REGT	72.94	67.10	92.50	96.00	75.00	28.13	53.33	58.33
2 BN 33 REGT	84.07	76.13	85.00	53.33	90.00	43.12	61.60	77.50
3 BN 33 REGT	72.16	65.33	88.00	37.78	70.00	31.87	57.83	60.83
4 BN 33 REGT	86.81	76.77	55.00	86.15	93.33	61.87	61.30	75.65
INF BN AVERAGE	82.33	74.68	78.32	75.54	82.32	53.59	64.01	79.49

P-13

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

P-14

51 INFANTRY REGIMENT 1 CORPS

ORGANIZATION		OPER	EFFEC	TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
INF REGT RATING											
51 REGT			95.71		84.00	73.33	84.00	90.00	68.00	90.77	92.00
INF BN RATINGS											
1 BN	51 REGT		87.14		85.88	70.00	80.00	83.33	77.33	83.20	83.33
2 BN	51 REGT		85.71		88.24	53.33	91.11	83.33	73.75	89.23	90.00
3 BN	51 REGT		87.41		86.67	80.00	86.67	83.33	68.75	81.74	83.33
4 BN	51 REGT		89.29		84.44	65.00	86.67	83.33	66.25	79.29	86.67
INF BN AVERAGE			87.39		86.31	77.08	86.11	83.33	71.52	83.36	87.08

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRBORNE DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
1 ABN BN	90.43	78.00	100.00	97.14	83.33	83.75	87.62	91.67
2 ABN BN	100.00	90.67	100.00	0.0	100.00	82.50	92.80	98.33
3 ABN BN	84.00	90.00	0.0	85.71	83.33	74.29	72.22	84.00
5 ABN BN	94.29	84.00	80.00	75.00	66.67	100.00	84.52	92.50
6 ABN BN	92.17	87.06	100.00	84.00	93.33	70.00	90.00	88.33
7 ABN BN	90.43	81.54	0.0	65.00	90.00	77.50	90.00	95.00
8 ABN BN	85.71	83.08	0.0	82.86	83.33	68.00	90.43	86.67
9 ABN BN	73.85	84.00	20.00	96.00	100.00	60.00	65.22	66.67
11 ABN BN	88.85	94.12	70.00	73.33	93.33	92.50	87.50	91.67
AVERAGE	88.86	85.83	78.33	82.38	88.15	78.73	84.48	89.31

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
17 CAV SQDN	88.80	78.82	80.00	83.33	83.33	50.00	70.00	91.67
7 CAV SQDN	95.17	90.00	90.00	100.00	90.00	68.75	85.52	90.00
11 CAV SQDN	82.86	84.71	50.00	100.00	83.33	60.00	72.17	85.00
4 CAV SQDN	95.71	94.86	55.00	81.82	100.00	91.25	87.41	91.30
3 CAV SQDN	74.25	70.00	80.00	0.00	73.33	40.00	57.86	80.00
14 CAV SQDN	83.11	78.71	53.33	80.00	78.33	61.25	67.20	80.87
8 CAV SQDN	82.07	76.67	80.00	67.06	86.67	68.75	68.28	79.17
15 CAV SQDN	92.41	87.22	50.00	80.00	96.67	60.00	81.15	89.17
18 CAV SQDN	94.83	87.65	50.00	85.71	91.67	61.25	82.31	90.00
1 CAV SQDN	99.26	86.67	100.00	85.33	100.00	76.25	75.36	91.67
5 CAV SQDN	95.00	90.30	0.00	100.00	88.00	63.87	86.67	87.39
10 CAV SQDN	73.33	80.00	40.00	60.00	90.00	56.67	57.37	86.67
12 CAV SQDN	78.82	90.00	100.00	57.14	88.33	52.31	74.29	80.87
16 CAV SQDN	82.86	82.35	80.00	70.00	90.00	37.86	63.64	78.26
6 CAV SQDN	96.97	87.50	90.00	100.00	100.00	77.14	84.21	99.00
2 CAV SQDN	73.93	80.56	66.67	67.27	81.67	45.62	67.12	76.67
9 CAV SQDN	76.44	78.40	86.67	78.57	85.45	45.33	63.64	78.95
AVERAGE	86.23	83.79	84.48	81.02	88.63	60.37	73.77	86.27

P-16

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RANGER BATTALION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LFADER SHIP
21 RANGER BN	79.58	83.87	C.O	68.57	78.00	61.82	70.53	90.48
37 RANGFR BN	76.28	83.87	86.67	60.00	76.00	51.43	71.11	90.53
39 RANGER BN	86.67	80.62	80.00	78.00	78.33	52.00	67.65	84.76
11 RANGER BN	76.47	78.86	50.00	46.67	80.00	53.79	75.22	77.50
22 RANGER BN	88.44	87.65	80.00	60.00	93.33	71.25	76.09	90.83
23 RANGER BN	71.36	78.18	77.50	60.00	76.67	56.87	68.93	89.33
30 RANGFR BN	50.68	83.87	100.00	85.00	95.00	74.55	86.09	87.27
31 RANGFR BN	88.36	83.89	66.67	67.78	80.00	61.29	71.64	90.83
33 RANGFR BN	73.33	72.50	86.67	90.00	76.67	56.00	74.78	78.33
34 RANGER BN	79.62	70.71	50.00	90.00	71.67	51.25	62.71	86.67
35 RANGER BN	86.15	81.33	100.00	100.00	76.67	62.86	75.09	85.45
36 RANGER BN	65.96	81.67	86.67	62.22	78.33	45.62	65.33	66.67
38 RANGER BN	86.91	77.14	80.00	100.00	81.67	59.38	70.20	85.45
51 RANGER BN	51.11	88.24	85.00	100.00	80.00	72.50	84.00	88.33
52 RANGER BN	67.50	80.00	76.67	68.89	80.00	36.25	54.33	66.67
32 RANGER BN	65.42	71.25	66.67	90.00	76.67	41.18	74.12	63.33
41 RANGER BN	81.51	65.00	65.00	90.00	73.33	60.00	69.57	81.67
42 RANGER BN	70.70	67.83	70.00	90.00	73.33	32.22	55.83	77.00
43 RANGER BN	87.62	69.29	100.00	74.67	76.67	67.27	77.65	88.33
44 RANGER BN	82.80	73.71	50.00	68.00	85.00	56.25	74.69	78.33
AVERAGE	79.84	77.97	83.03	77.49	79.37	56.19	71.28	82.34

P-17

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

VIETNAMESE MARINE DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PEP S/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
1 MARINE BN	82.78	83.33	100.00	100.00	75.00	65.00	75.00	89.09
2 MARINE BN	80.85	75.35	100.00	100.00	80.00	65.71	73.68	91.67
3 MARINE BN	87.03	82.50	100.00	60.00	90.00	76.00	77.65	88.33
4 MARINE BN	79.57	80.77	92.00	100.00	80.00	55.83	74.67	86.67
5 MARINE BN	82.08	87.10	100.00	100.00	93.33	64.35	77.50	86.67
7 MARINE BN	85.20	85.33	60.00	100.00	76.67	48.00	68.75	83.33
AVERAGE	82.92	83.06	92.00	93.33	80.83	62.48	74.54	87.63

D-18

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
I CORPS								
44 ARTY BN	88.57	81.67	-C.00	-0.00	86.67	75.56	92.50	93.33
64 ARTY BN	87.62	80.00	-C.00	-0.00	83.33	73.33	85.00	91.11
10 ARTY BN	92.00	96.25	-C.00	-0.00	89.09	68.33	75.00	100.00
11 ARTY BN	93.53	92.94	-C.00	-0.00	92.73	61.67	75.00	100.00
12 ARTY BN	93.94	94.12	-0.00	-0.00	92.73	61.67	75.00	96.00
14 ARTY BN	91.18	94.12	-C.00	-0.00	85.45	65.45	75.00	90.67
48 ARTY BN	88.00	91.76	-C.00	-0.00	81.82	61.82	75.00	85.33
62 ARTY BN	89.09	91.76	-C.00	-0.00	85.45	58.33	75.00	88.00
20 ARTY BN	94.71	100.00	-C.00	-0.00	100.00	97.78	93.33	100.00
21 ARTY BN	95.76	98.89	-C.00	-0.00	100.00	92.00	95.56	100.00
22 ARTY BN	92.26	98.67	-C.00	-0.00	94.55	82.00	97.78	100.00
23 ARTY BN	96.97	98.89	-C.00	-0.00	89.09	82.00	98.00	100.00
I CORPS AVERAGE	91.97	93.26	C.0	0.0	90.08	73.33	84.35	95.37
II CORPS								
37 ARTY BN	77.78	80.00	-C.00	-0.00	66.67	62.00	84.00	85.71
63 ARTY BN	77.71	78.00	-C.00	-0.00	66.67	54.00	82.22	84.29
220 ARTY BN	75.76	74.44	-C.00	-0.00	75.00	53.33	82.22	92.50
221 ARTY BN	77.14	79.00	-C.00	-0.00	66.67	54.00	82.22	84.52
222 ARTY BN	78.24	78.00	-C.00	-0.00	66.67	54.00	82.22	78.45
223 ARTY BN	77.14	78.00	-C.00	-0.00	66.67	54.00	82.22	81.54
230 ARTY BN	87.83	81.25	-C.00	-0.00	83.33	76.00	87.50	96.00
231 ARTY BN	90.00	80.00	-C.00	-0.00	83.33	76.00	87.50	96.00
232 ARTY BN	88.70	80.00	-C.00	-0.00	83.33	76.00	87.50	96.00
233 ARTY BN	86.96	80.00	-C.00	-0.00	83.33	76.00	88.57	96.00
II CORPS AVERAGE	81.72	78.87	C.0	0.0	74.17	63.53	84.62	89.11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

ORGANIZATION	OPFR EFFECTIVENESS	PERSONNEL	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAINING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
III CORPS								
46 ARTY BN	53.04	93.75	-0.00	-0.00	96.67	94.00	100.00	94.00
61 ARTY BN	53.18	94.37	-0.00	-0.00	93.33	72.00	91.43	95.56
50 ARTY BN	49.57	71.03	-0.00	-0.00	40.00	32.00	47.50	72.00
51 ARTY BN	61.42	68.57	-0.00	-0.00	54.55	50.00	52.00	70.50
52 ARTY BN	56.10	72.14	-0.00	-0.00	54.55	55.00	53.85	74.00
53 ARTY BN	52.17	63.08	-0.00	-0.00	36.67	38.89	41.25	60.00
180 ARTY BN	71.89	97.55	-0.00	-0.00	70.00	73.33	93.33	60.00
181 ARTY BN	82.72	85.41	-0.00	-0.00	90.00	66.00	87.50	88.89
182 ARTY BN	80.00	87.50	-0.00	-0.00	90.00	62.00	90.00	96.67
183 ARTY BN	84.00	96.25	-0.00	-0.00	90.00	73.33	98.57	93.33
250 ARTY BN	89.57	91.25	-0.00	-0.00	90.00	74.00	85.00	90.00
251 ARTY BN	89.57	88.75	-0.00	-0.00	93.33	74.00	95.00	90.00
252 ARTY BN	87.82	98.75	-0.00	-0.00	93.33	92.00	97.50	98.00
253 ARTY BN	91.30	91.25	-0.00	-0.00	93.33	90.00	97.50	90.00
III CORPS AVERAGE	77.21	83.84	0.0	0.0	73.98	64.18	77.17	82.65
IV CORPS								
47 ARTY BN	63.50	75.23	-0.00	-0.00	70.00	31.11	68.57	82.35
67 ARTY BN	66.51	76.00	-0.00	-0.00	70.00	43.33	63.75	71.00
58 ARTY BN	80.00	70.00	-0.00	-0.00	72.00	60.00	57.50	78.00
70 ARTY BN	76.84	74.67	-0.00	-0.00	76.67	42.00	70.00	82.22
71 ARTY BN	75.79	75.31	-0.00	-0.00	73.33	58.00	57.50	82.22
72 ARTY BN	86.32	83.33	-0.00	-0.00	85.67	66.00	72.50	84.44
73 ARTY BN	77.35	80.00	-0.00	-0.00	70.00	58.00	62.50	80.00
90 ARTY BN	77.07	84.25	-0.00	-0.00	66.00	62.00	74.67	88.42
91 ARTY BN	75.38	81.67	-0.00	-0.00	66.67	64.00	70.00	86.67
92 ARTY BN	62.44	72.00	-0.00	-0.00	57.50	90.00	70.00	90.77
93 ARTY BN	72.05	85.71	-0.00	-0.00	60.00	80.00	90	86.67
210 ARTY BN	70.22	81.25	-0.00	-0.00	81.67	52.84	83.75	83.14
211 ARTY BN	64.76	84.38	-0.00	-0.00	68.00	42.50	73.85	91.25
212 ARTY BN	72.50	76.67	-0.00	-0.00	76.36	46.00	70.77	70.53

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
IV CORPS								
213 ARTY BN	74.76	68.75	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	50.00	72.50	72.00
IV CORPS AVERAGE	73.07	78.49	0.0	0.0	71.66	57.05	70.56	83.31

D-21

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRBORNE AND MARINE ARTILLERY

102 ABN ARTY	58.62	76.36	-0.00	-0.00	70.00	34.00	32.00	70.00
103 ABN ARTY	65.60	81.67	-0.00	-0.00	64.00	34.00	41.43	76.25
301 MAR ARTY	83.53	90.00	-0.00	-0.00	73.33	72.00	90.00	97.78
302 MAR ARTY	83.53	90.00	-0.00	-0.00	73.33	72.00	90.00	97.78
303 MAR ARTY	83.53	90.00	-0.00	-0.00	73.33	72.00	90.00	97.78
ABN/MAR AVERAGE	74.88	85.61	0.0	0.0	70.80	56.80	68.69	87.92

D-22

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX E

Combat Support Received

This annex presents the totals of various types of combat support received by maneuver battalions, as reported by battalion advisors. Also presented is the "per battalion share," or the total for the major organization divided by the number of maneuver battalions in that organization.

E-1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATION	COMBAT SUPPORT RECEIVED 4TH QTR. CY 70								
	ARTY ROUNDS	NAVAL GUNFIRE ROUNDS	HEL GUNSHIP SORTIES	FXD WING GUNSHIP SORTIES	TAC AIR SORTIES	HEL LIFT SORTIES	FXD WING LIFT SORTIES	HEL MED EVAC SORTIES	AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES
1st DIV	33140	560	146	20	157	1061	0	135	897
2d DIV	19630	0	95	8	34	1467	0	141	593
51st REGT	4200	0	96	1	25	774	0	67	145
MR 1	56970	560	337	29	216	3302	0	343	1635
22d DIV	18360	0	421	1	7	3227	6	107	771
23d DIV	6560	120	351	0	25	1599	8	47	393
MR 2	24920	120	772	1	32	4826	14	154	1164
5th DIV	30430	0	260	2	131	1664	10	113	209
18th DIV	11440	0	9	3	12	183	0	20	41
25th DIV	5960	0	710	1	3	1959	0	76	3
MR 3	47830	0	979	6	146	3806	10	209	253
7th DIV	39300	0	181	18	18	1805	0	287	662
9th DIV	39570	350	434	164	219	1492	0	295	459
21st DIV	28770	690	719	122	36	3718	0	153	494
MR 4	107640	1040	1334	304	273	7015	0	735	1615
INF TOTAL	237360	1720	3422	340	667	18949	24	1441	4667
AB	28310	20	143	0	684	1910	34	85	646
CV	28810	520	43	26	105	83	0	102	109
VNMC	2060	60	108	47	4	761	56	69	314
FN	51880	0	961	53	144	4319	25	331	772
ARVN/VNMC/TOTAL	348420	2320	4677	466	1604	26022	139	2028	6508

Page 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATION	COMBAT SUPPORT RECEIVED PER AVG BN 4TH QTR CY 70								
	ARTY ROUNDS	NAVAL GUNFIRE ROUNDS	HEL GUNSHIP SORTIES	FXD WING GUNSHIP SORTIES	TAC AIR SORTIES	HEL LIFT SORTIES	FXD WING LIFT SORTIES	HEL MED EVAC SORTIES	AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES
1st Div	1949.41	32.94	8.5	1.1	9.2	62.4	0	7.9	52.7
2d Div	1635.83	0	7.9	.6	2.8	122.2	0	11.7	49.4
51st Regt	1050.83	0	24.0	.2	6.2	193.5	0	16.7	36.2
MR 1	1726.36	16.96	10.2	.8	6.5	100.0	0	10.3	49.5
22d Div	2173.33	0	40.0	0	.5	424.7	.5	11.5	89.7
23d Div	546.66	10.00	29.2	0	2.0	133.2	.6	3.9	32.7
MR 2	890.00	4.28	27.5	0	1.1	172.3	.5	5.5	41.5
5th Div	2535.83	0	21.6	.1	10.9	138.6	.8	9.4	17.4
18th Div	953.33	0	.7	.2	1.0	15.2	0	1.6	3.4
25th Div	496.66	0	59.1	0	.2	163.2	0	6.3	.2
MR 3	1328.61	0	27.1	.1	4.0	105.7	.2	5.8	7.0
7th Div	3275.00	0	15.0	1.5	1.5	150.4	0	23.9	55.1
9th Div	3297.50	29.16	36.1	13.6	18.2	124.3	0	24.5	38.2
21th Div	2397.50	57.50	59.9	10.1	3.0	309.8	0	12.7	41.1
MR 4	2990.00	28.88	37.0	8.4	7.5	194.8	0	20.4	44.8
Inf TOTAL	1784.66	12.93	25.7	2.5	5.0	142.4	.1	10.8	35.0
AB	3145.55	2.22	15.8	0	76.0	212.2	3.7	9.4	71.7
CV	1694.70	30.58	2.5	1.5	6.1	4.8	0	6.0	6.4
VNMC	228.88	6.66	12.0	5.2	.4	84.5	6.2	7.6	34.8
RN	2594.00	0	48.0	2.6	7.2	215.9	1.2	16.5	38.6
ARVN/VNMC/TOTAL	1853.29	12.34	24.8	2.4	8.5	138.4	.7	10.7	34.6

F-3

CONFIDENTIAL



THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED  
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND  
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON  
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.